Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [101]
The NVA fire petered out for just a moment, and Menzel got on the hook to Brookshire to request artillery support. Brookshire acknowledged. At that moment, Menzel, looking up at the C&C Huey, saw four black smudges suddenly appear around the command ship. More antiaircraft shells burst around the Huey, and it dove out of the cone of fire.
Menzel ordered Crupper to reinforce.
The ACAV behind Menzel was burning furiously now, and a burst of machine gun fire splattered among its road wheels. The enemy gunner swung his fire to the next track in line–Menzel's–and Menzel frantically fired his AK where he saw the brush shaking from the machine gun's concussion. He'd already pitched eight or nine grenades, and now he fired four more magazines, then dropped the AK to the floor of the ACAV and wrapped his hands around an M16. The M60 gunner beside him tossed aside another empty ammunition box and started reloading from another hundred-round box. Menzel opened fire with the M16 as the lead ACAV of Crupper's platoon approached the burning ACAV, smashed its way a bit into the roadside thickets, and commenced firing point-blank into the enemy's flank with its .50-cal.
A hail of red and orange tracers snapped through the bamboo and between trees. The NVA, whom no one had seen, disappeared into the jungle.
Brookshire came back up on the troop net, and in minutes G Troop was rolling on past their gutted ACAV toward a new squadron laager at the southern end of the trail. The laager had been blasted out of the jungle by a Commando Vault dropped by the USAF. The mood at the evening briefing was apprehensive. Although their initial thrust into the area had stunned the NVA, what appeared to be a fanatical security element of the division headquarters that they were tracking had quickly reorganized. With the squadron's movements channelized along the enemy supply trails because of the heavy forests, NVA rocket-propelled grenade teams were setting up easy ambushes. If they stayed, Brookshire explained to his assembled troop commanders, they could still kill NVA, but with the NVA exploiting their own weaknesses, their casualties would increase. For that reason they were going to pull out.
Fearing the worst on the next day's drive out, Brookshire told Sisson that the tanks of H Company would lead the column.
Menzel, however, volunteered to lead with G Troop since he knew the terrain. Brookshire denied the request. H Company also knew the area and he wanted them on point because, as the slowest moving element, they would set the pace.
The next morning, 14 May 1970, Captain Sisson took his place in his chair atop his tank turret and followed the lead tank of H Company as they proceeded north on the trail. The M48 Pattons, which were wider than Sheridans and ACAVs, had to bull their way up the path, their treads catching in the thick vegetation hemming them in from both sides. More than one tank threw a track, a problem that had plagued the company since they entered the area. Their suspension systems were in poor shape because of the constant movement precipitated by the incursion. However, they ground on until Menzel of G Troop, which was following H Company, radioed Sisson, “Battle Four-six, this is Three-six. You are approaching the area of contact. Recommend some recon by fire. Over.”
“Roger, Three-six.” Sisson's voice suddenly shot into a scream. “No! No! Get him y get him!”
The radio went dead.
Tank fire boomed from the front of the column, and Menzel could see smoke and dust rising from the trees as he tried to raise Sisson on the radio. No one answered. G Troop pivoted into herringbone formation in case they also came under fire, but were jammed in place by the logs that the NVA had again laid along the shoulders. The NVA ambush was almost perfect.
The ambush had begun with an RPG fired dead ahead