Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [157]
A few moments later, another WP shell exploded in a fiery cloud of white, and Schulcz was again on the radio, “Hey, somebody just shot a round and it's right over our head.”
“That can't be. Nobody's shooting in your area.”
“Bullshit!” Lieutenant Colonel Knotts's voice suddenly cut into the net from his Loach overhead. “That round almost blew me out of the air!”
Colonel Whitehead had originally briefed General Abrams and Major General Bautz on this phase of Operation Bold Lancer, following which Abrams had commented to Bautz, “Well, you've got just the right man to do it, too.” Bautz responded with a small laugh, “He may not be here two days from now.” Whitehead's six months of command time ran out just before the start of the incursion, and Bautz had tried without success to retain him. Abrams simply said, “Well, we'll take care of that.” Sure enough, Whitehead's replacement, Col. Sam C. Holliday, did not take command on schedule and remained an observer until 15 May 1970. An excellent infantry officer in Korea, Holliday was on his first Vietnam tour, and the pace of Cambodia gave him no time to observe and learn. Regretfully then, on 5 June 1970, Bautz relieved Holliday of command. Colonel Walworth F. Williams, CO, 3d Brigade, 9th Division, wore a second hat as CO, 2d Brigade, 25th Division, until 21 June 1970, at which time Col. Joseph R. Ulatoski arrived to take command during the closing days of Cambodia.
The Sheridan stayed in Vietnam after its test period because of the official conclusion that its mobility, firepower, range, and night-fighting ability were superior to those of the vehicle it replaced, but Captain Speedy, CO, K/3-11 ACR, rebutted, “When I tried to turn my Sheridans in for M48s or ACAVs, squadron and regiment reacted like raped apes. It was politics: You must learn to exploit the capabilities of the new system. Crap! It was a loser. Drive sprocket hubs vibrated off and turret problems defied our best efforts. One vexing turret problem required technicians to fly into Cambodia from Long Binh. Their verdict: All systems are green but the gun won't shoot. My Pfcs had already figured that out. In addition, mines blew holes into the bellies of Sheridans and hence right into the 152mm rounds. Superheated gases inhaled by crewmen destroyed the lungs. Death came several days later. Company grade officers voiced these concerns. Months later, some dorks in CONUS sent us the results of a study saying that the Sheridan rounds were as safe as 90mm rounds in the M48. How reassuring. We had a hard time grasping how a lightweight vehicle with 152mm combustible cartridge rounds could be as safe as a fifty-two-ton tank with brass 90mm rounds. But the major purpose of the study had been accomplished: The Army had covered its ass.”
Chapter 30: BODY COUNTING
May 10, 1970. As the APCs of A Company, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 22d Infantry, 25th Division, slowly lurched along the rutty, sandy, dirt road, the dust was such that some GIs tied their sweat towels over their noses and mouths. Jim Ross, manning an M60 machine gun atop his track, wiped the sweat and dust from his face every few moments with his once olive-drab and now brown towel. His buddy, Dennis Hiedeman, sat with his back to the cupola, absently talking with him, the steel helmets and flak jackets they wore as smothering as the plumes of dust they passed through from each of the tracks ahead.
Ross's and Hiedeman's primary concern was being on an easily mined road, but they were nicely tucked in the middle of the column. They mostly prayed for some shade. The sudden roar was shattering and completely unanticipated. Hiedeman was abruptly spread-eagled on the road fifteen feet behind his track. No glasses. No steel pot. No M16. Dust floated down from far above. Ross, deafened by the concussion before he could hear the explosion, his hip throbbing from where he'd hit the track deck