Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [233]
The Blackhorse Regiment was in the process of disengaging and retiring toward the border, and the NVA, who knew the political timetable their enemy had imposed upon himself, had begun using in earnest their RPG teams and mortar crews along Route 7. The seasonal monsoon restricted the Blackhorse to the main roads. Even though the NVA attacks had thus far lacked weight, when Colonel Starry, CO, 11th ACR, received the official withdrawal orders on 19 June 1970, the general concern was that the NVA would mount a major attack to cut the highway. Colonel Starry's orders left 2-11 ACR opcon to the 1st Cavalry Division, but placed under the 25th Division the 1-11 ACR, 3-11 ACR, and the attached 3-4 Cav, at a time when the regiment was spread out for some hundred kilometers. Lieutenant Colonel Coffman's 2-11 ACR was the farthest north, operating from FSB Sisson, patrolling the Rome Plow roads around FSB Myron south to Snoul, and Highway 13 from Snoul east to Loc Ninh across the border. Lieutenant Colonel Griffin's 3-11 ACR, operating from FSB Susan, kept Route 7 open south of Snoul to a point where Lieutenant Colonel Knotts's 3-4 Cav, operating from FSB Schulcz and FSB Koropey, picked up Route 7 to Memot, as well as a Rome Plow road that had been carved due south from the highway to Katum.
The roads were being kept open for the truck convoys back-hauling material from the enemy caches. The Blackhorse and the Three-Quarter Horse were to follow the last trucks out, no later than 28 June, via Highway 13 and Route 7.
Lieutenant Colonel Reed's 1-11 ACR, operating from FSB Colorado, was meanwhile still conducting land-clearing operations east of Route 7 against an NVA unit that had ensconced itself in a jungle almost primeval with its towering trees, hanging vines, and trapped, smothering heat. The area had originally been bypassed during the thunder run to Snoul. When the ARVN Airborne subsequently turned their attention to it, their operation bogged down amid the impenetrable underbrush, terrible weather, and stiff enemy resistance. When Reed's squadron was tapped to continue the operation, the 60th and, later, the 984th Land Clearing Companies, 62d Engineer Battalion, 20th Engineer Brigade, were placed under his command to carve entrances into the NVA complex with their Rome Plows. The original plan had envisioned the bulldozers cutting south toward the border and dissecting the jungle in a Y pattern, but on the first day, 4 June, they had pushed only five hundred meters into the forest before running into heavy contact. Loach pilots were aloft to guide the Rome Plow drivers, who could see nothing from their cabs. Each day more trees were toppled as they pushed deeper into the jungle, and more RPGs would suddenly flash from the vegetation. At that point, the bulldozers would try to drop back, but would get hung up on stumps or back into trees, and the Sheridans and ACAVs would try to maneuver forward to pump thousands of rounds through the trees.
It was hit and run, and GIs died before anyone could see the enemy. Night laagers were mortared. Monsoon showers mired the vehicles. Reed realized that they were battering their way only into the fringes of the jungle complex, but even so the meaning of the NVA resistance became clear as an impressive amount of enemy material was being captured, including 10,000 rounds of various caliber small arms ammunition and 500 mortar rounds. An underground hôpital was discovered that contained a ton of medical supplies: plasma, morphine, antibiotics, surgical equipment, and an X-ray machine made in France. Reed landed his C&C Huey in one clearing of toppled trees and mashed down vegetation to lift out 200 pounds of captured documents that were neatly arranged in file cabinets.
The jungle promised more contacts and more finds, but on 24 June, Reed received word that the operation was over. Politics, not enemy pressure, dictated their retreat from the jungle complex. Politics also required Reed to adhere to