Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [26]
Privately, though, Colonel Conrad was probably the most apprehensive man at FSB Illingworth. To remain in place more than four days in War Zone C was to invite attack. Within days of originally setting up, Conrad and Moore had already selected the next two locations to which they planned to hop. But the word to move never came.
Both FSB Illingworth and FSB Jay, a similar stronghold to the south manned by a sister battalion, were only a hike away from Cambodia and were situated on heavily trafficked infiltration routes. The disruption of these routes caused by the patrols originating from Illingworth and Jay was valuable enough, but higher command also anticipated that the enraged NVA would be tempted out of their sanctuary and into open attacks on the two positions. Once the positions were exposed, superior U.S. firepower could decimate the assaults before they could reach the berm lines. It had worked before, but when the smoke would clear this time, Colonel Conrad would find himself wishing he had pounded harder on someone's door at division. He considered Illingworth too flimsy to dangle as bait on the Cambodian border:
I did discuss my tenuous situation with Colonel Ochs and Brigadier General Casey more than once; and with Major General Roberts when he visited Illingworth. All agreed it was risky for us to remain much longer, and I stressed the fact that our good fortune in the past several weeks was primarily due to our constant movement. Casey especially realized this, but Roberts strongly believed that our presence there was really upsetting the NVA flow of material and, hence, wanted us to remain a little longer. He did agree, however, to release additional culverts, wire, sandbags, PSP, etc. He also directed that eight-inch guns come in along with quad-fifties. I didn't want them because there was so little room and they just made Illingworth all the more of an inviting target.
If Brigadier General Casey indeed did lean toward Lieutenant Colonel Conrad's reading of the situation, Major General Roberts commented that such was not made clear to him:“I am certain that if Casey had recommended Illing worth be evacuated I would have agreed.”
General Roberts commented further:
Illingworth was deliberately selected to set squarely astride of and to interdict the major NVA infiltration route into the War Zone C area from Cambodia. This was well known by division command at the time. Its selection and retention was not inadvertent. The monumental effort that the NVA exerted to dislodge Illingworth and Jay bear witness to the importance the NVA attached to these two firebases.
The NVA took the bait, although FSB Jay, not FSB Illingworth, was their first target. Jay had been established by the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Lt. Col. Robert Hannas), south of Illingworth on 18 March 1970. Their initial landing had been greeted by AK47 fire from the western tree line, and the subsequent patrols by the 2d of the 7th, like those of the 2d of the 8th, bumped into contact after contact. Colonel Conrad flew in to exchange information about the placement of their harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires and the locations of their daylight patrols and night ambushes with Colonel Hannas. Afterward, Conrad joked with Hannas that tiny, congested Jay was an even worse position than Illingworth and chided his friend about placing his cot atop his command bunker: It had proven too miserably hot inside the bunker.
Colonel Hannas, a fine soldier, should have been more cautious, but there were those of the opinion that the 1st Cav's biggest and practically only problem was overconfidence.
At 0415, 29 March 1970, a tripflare suddenly ignited in the tree line south of FSB Jay, and the firebase was immediately deluged by rocket, mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket-propelled grenade fire. A battalion