Into Cambodia - Keith Nolan [45]
On 23 April, Memot fell to the NVA.
On 24 April, the NVA attacked the seaside resort at Kep, killed several civilians, and set fire to the municipal buildings.
On 26 April, the NVA captured Ang Tassom, began attacking Chlong City–they were continually driving closer to Phnom Penh–and opened fire on shipping on the Mekong River.
That night, Nixon made up his mind. Fully aware of the antiwar explosion that would be ignited in the newsrooms and on campuses, and elsewhere, if American troops should enter Cambodia, Nixon nonethe-less understood the need for decisive action. If Cambodia fell, the NVA would be able to mount large offensives, which would increase allied casualties and slow the withdrawals. Damned if he did and damned if he didn't, Nixon opted for the military solution.3
The decision made, the order was passed to attack into the Fishhook. In the air-conditioned offices of G-3 operations, II FFV, Long Binh, under Col. Elmer D. Pendelton, Jr., the plans were prepared for the approval of Generals Abrams and Davison. Colonel Pendelton had served three previous tours with the ARVN and the Big Red One and let it be known that this was a major's war, that from the cubicles of his staff officers would emerge the direction of the entire campaign. Pendelton was a man who took his responsibilities very seriously, especially when American lives were at stake, and who believed correctly that one can never be too prepared in combat. Better a thousand criticisms for too much preparation than one for not enough. One of his assistants, Major Kerver, commented on the working atmosphere at the Plantation:
Elmer Pendelton was in his glory. He had no family, at least none that I know of–this was his love, this was his baby. To him it wasn't work at all, it was a joy, it was a glorious and wonderful thing to get out there at five o'clock every morning and just go on through till midnight, and grab a few hours rest and get up the next day and start all over again, seven days a week. He always made it clear that he'd much rather be out there commanding troops, and you could hardly imagine this hard driving, gutsy, earthy sort of character being a guy with a graduate degree from a top university, yet he was. You'd walk into his office and his favorite saying was, “What-ya-got?”–that's all–and you'd immediately tell him why you were there and he'd give you a curt or a blunt reply. Elmer was a character to say the least, and an awful lot of people either did not like him or couldn't get along with him. Elmer wanted everybody to think the G-3 people were the ones that were really running the war. That's the mentality that Elmer was trying to create and one way he had of creating it was making a lot of busy work, just something to make sure they were working and everyone knew they were working while much of the rest of the staff had time off. You really looked forward to R&R to get away from this mad rat race.
Actually, Colonel Pendelton's role in Cambodia did not fully unfold until the operation had been initiated, for the initial planning had been done in the Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, at Phuoc Vinh. A midafternoon call via secure telephone, on 25 April, from General Abrams to Major General Roberts had begun the process: Abrams told an incredu-lous Roberts to prepare plans for an attack into the Fishhook, and to present them to his headquarters the next day. Roberts was further in-structed to limit the number of individuals on his staff having knowledge of this to not more than five members. The next morning, Roberts and his crew flew to Saigon to brief Abrams and his own chief of staff. Abrams approved the plan, and instructed his