Invictus - Carlin [27]
Barnard also bore the more difficult task of preparing President Botha, the “krokodil,” to meet with Mandela. The initial pressure for such a meeting came from Mandela himself, who began to express some impatience with the pace of progress. He wanted these talks to pave the way for a negotiations process involving the ANC, the government, and all other parties that wished to take part, aimed at ending apartheid by peaceful means. When 1989 came around, after more than six months of meetings between prisoner and spy, Mandela had had enough. “It is good to have preliminary discussions with you on the fundamental issues,” Mandela said to Barnard, “but you will understand that you are not a politician. You don’t have the authority and the power. I must have a discussion with Mr. Botha himself, as quickly as possible.”
In March 1989, Barnard delivered a letter from Mandela to his boss. In it Mandela argued that the only way a lasting peace could be reached in South Africa would be via a negotiated settlement. He said that the black majority had no intention, however, of accepting the terms of a surrender. “Majority rule and internal peace,” he wrote, “are like the two sides of a single coin, and White South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability in this country until the principle is fully applied.”
Perhaps more significant than this letter was the fact that Mandela had already convinced Barnard of the argument it contained. Barnard would convince his boss, even if the letter could not.
“Yes . . . ,” Barnard said, a fondness creeping into the steely flatness of his voice, “the old man”—he meant Mandela—“he is one of those strange individuals who captivates you. He has this strange charisma. You find yourself wanting to listen to him . . . So, yes,” continued Barnard, “there was, in our minds, looking from an intelligence perspective, never the slightest doubt. This is the man—if you cannot find a settlement with him, any settlement will be out.”
That was the point he argued before Botha. But there were other arguments he recommended the president consider too. The world was changing fast. The anti-communist Solidarity movement had come to power in Poland; demonstrations in Tiananmen Square were calling for Chinese reform; the Soviet army ended its nine-year occupation of Afghanistan; the Berlin Wall was tottering. Apartheid belonged, like communism, to another age.
Barnard’s arguments influenced Botha, yet the president might have continued to dither, bristle, and pace inside his mental fortress had biological destiny not intervened. A stroke he suffered in January 1989 injected a new urgency into his dealings. He was more respected than loved by his cabinet peers, and some of them feared him. His enemies within his own National Party, sensing weakness at last, were circling for the kill. Barnard, one of the few people who actually felt affection for Botha, sensed that his boss’s days in office were numbered and that he had to act quickly. “I remember telling him that the time was absolutely right to meet Mr. Mandela, as quickly as possible. If not, we are going to slip, perhaps, one of the most important opportunities in our history. My views with Mr. Botha were the following: ‘Mr. President, if you meet Mandela and it becomes the basis, the foundation for future development in our country, history will always acknowledge you as the man who started this due process. In my considered opinion, there is only a win-win situation.’ ”
It was a polite way of saying that here maybe was the last opportunity Botha would have to be remembered not entirely as a large, terrifying reptile. Botha got the message and Barnard reported back to Mandela with the happy news that the president had agreed to meet him. “But I warned him, ‘Listen, this is an ice-breaker meeting. It is not about fundamental issues. Come to learn about the man. Talk about