Iran - Andrew Burke [20]
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AFTER KHOMEINI
When Ayatollah Khomeini died on 4 June 1989 he left an uncertain legacy. Khomeini’s position as Supreme Leader passed to the former president, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The presidency, which had previously been a largely ceremonial post, was transformed with the election of the cleric Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who began a series of much-needed economic reforms. Despite being widely seen as the richest – and most corrupt – man in the country, Rafsanjani was re-elected in 1993. Social and religious conservatism remained firmly ingrained in Iranian society and he could never be described as a liberal, but domestic policy took on a far more pragmatic tone. This included an aggressive campaign to curb sky-rocketing population growth through contraception. A greater focus on the poor brought electricity, running water, telephone and sealed roads to rural areas long ignored under royal rule.
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At the urging of the new Islamic government, Iranian women had, on average, six children each during the 1980s; the population almost doubled in a decade.
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On the international front, however, Iran continued to be unpopular. In 1995 the USA slapped a trade embargo on Iran on the grounds that it was a state sponsor of terrorism.
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KHATAMI & THE REFORMISTS
In 1997 the moderate, reform-minded Ayatollah Hojjat-ol-Eslam Sayyed Mohammad Khatami won the presidency in a landslide. Almost everyone, and especially the ruling clerics, was shocked. Khatami was a liberal by Iranian standards, but he was also an insider. He had studied theology in Qom, had held important posts during the Iran–Iraq War and served as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance for 10 years until he was forced to resign in 1992 – for being too liberal.
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During the 1980s and early ‘90s several high-profile opposition leaders were assassinated while in exile in Europe. These included Kurdish human rights activist Dr Kazem Rajavi, shot in Switzerland in 1990, and former prime minister Shapur Bakhtiar, stabbed to death in Paris in 1991.
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His election sent an overwhelming message of discontent to the ruling Islamic conservatives and resulted in a spontaneous, unlegislated liberalisation. Suddenly, harsh laws on dress and social interaction were no longer being strictly enforced and women, especially those in Tehran and other major cities, embraced make-up, figure-hugging manteaus and hair-colouring products with unbridled enthusiasm.
Khatami promised ‘change from within’, a policy of avoiding confrontation with the clerics and engineering change from within the theocratic system. When reformers won a large majority in the Majlis in 2000 and Khatami was re-elected with 78% of the vote in 2001, hopes were high. But what the public wanted and what Khatami and the Majlis were able to deliver proved to be very different. Of the hundreds of pieces of legislation the Majlis passed during its four-year term, more than 35% were vetoed by the conservatives on the Guardian Council (see Government, Click here).
The conservative backlash didn’t stop there. Reformist intellectuals were assassinated, students beaten for protesting, dozens of reform-minded newspapers were closed and editors imprisoned. It was an effective campaign. With the reformers either unable or too scared to institute their promised reforms, the public lost faith in them and the idea of ‘change from within’.
By 2004 living in Iran had become significantly easier than it had been before Khatami’s election. Women had won greater freedoms, limited economic liberalisation had spurred economic growth, and art and cultural activities were (relatively) thriving. Huge amounts of money were being spent on infrastructure, with new roads, railways and, in four cities, underground railways. But many Iranians were disheartened. So many promised reforms – both economic and social – had not been delivered that they lost sight of what had