Irrational Economist_ Making Decisions in a Dangerous World - Erwann Michel-Kerjan [146]
2 She struggled to think straight about the great losses that the world ignores: “More than two million children die a year from diarrhea and eight hundred thousand from measles. Do we blink? Stalin starved seven million Ukrainians in one year, Pol Pot killed two million Cambodians” (Dillard, 1999, pp. 130-131).
3 Kogut and Ritov (2005).
4 Västfjäll, Peters, and Slovic (in preparation).
5 Lifton (1967).
6 Haidt (2001).
7 Batson et al. (1983, p. 718).
8 Slovic (2009).
Chapter 5 Michel-Kerjan: Haven’t You Switched to Risk Management 2.0 Yet?
1 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2006).
Chapter 6 Schoemaker: A Two-Edged Sword
1 I thank Eric Horvitz, Ron Howard, Tom Keelin, Paul Kleindorfer, J. Edward Russo, Carl Spetzler, and the editors for their valuable feedback.
2 See, for instance, the chapters by Robert Meyer and Howard Kunreuther in this book.
3 Measuring a person’s risk attitude, and applying it consistently to decisions involving risk or uncertainty, is an important part of decision analysis. It entails ranking simple lotteries and then reflecting the person’s implied risk preference into the utility numbers assigned to each outcome, as in our simple example.
4 Although its roots are in cognitive psychology, the field is now very much interested in the role of emotion and feeling, as well as in the social context of decisions, thus expanding its disciplinary base.
Chapter 7 Krantz: Constructed Preference and the Quest for Rationality
1 Category (a) includes taking on group identity or group status; enhancing group status; safety (feeling and being secure); efficacy (feeling and being capable or powerful); adherence to group norms; and sharing presence, activities, or experiences with other group members. Category (b) includes aspirations for specialized roles (formal or informal), aspirations for higher status within the group, and being able to make social comparisons within the group. Category (c) comprises a huge variety of obligations that stem from one’s achieved role or status, including coordination of others’ actions, adding or elaborating group norms, imposing sanctions on group members who violate norms, and working externally with other groups. Finally, category (d) includes both in-group and out-group goals: benefits to others in one’s group (reciprocation and nepotism) but also deprivation, discrimination, and negative reciprocation (punishment) directed against others toward whom one feels no affiliation.
2 Using the categories introduced in the previous note, we find that this subtype falls partly under (a), adherence to group norms, and partly under (c), since a standard may depend on one’s position (role/status) within a group.
Chapter 8 Kleindorfer: What If You Know You Will Have to Explain Your Choices to Others Afterwards?
1 I am grateful to the editors and Carol Heller, as well as to Stephanie Olen Kleindorfer, Erin L. Krupka, Eric Orts, and Paul Schoemaker, for valuable discussions and comments on this chapter.
2 Kunreuther’s early work is reviewed in Chapter 9 of Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1993).
3 See, for example, Easterling and Kunreuther (1995).
4 In one sense, such participation reflects an attempt to counter the mistrust of technocrats, as noted by anthropologist Michael Thompson and sociologist Ulrich Beck. This mistrust is directly connected to the legitimation process in twentieth-century philosophy—for example, in