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Irrational Economist_ Making Decisions in a Dangerous World - Erwann Michel-Kerjan [155]

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Catastrophes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).

2 Howard Kunreuther, with R. Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Slovic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz, Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons (Wiley Interscience, 1978).

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

George A. Akerlof, University of California, Berkeley

George Akerlof is the Daniel E. Koshland, Sr., Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He was educated at Yale and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2001, Professor Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science; he was honored for his theory of asymmetric information and its effect on economic behavior. In 2006, he became president of the American Economic Association, having served earlier as vice president and member of the executive committee. He is also on the North American Council of the Econometric Association. Professor Akerlof’s research interests include sociology and economics, theory of unemployment, assymetric information, staggered contract theory, money demand, labor market flows, theory of business cycles, economics of social customs, measurement of unemployment, and economics of discrimination.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University

Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Operations Research (Emeritus) at Stanford University. His work has been primarily in economic theory and operations, focusing on such areas as social choice theory, risk bearing, medical economics, general equilibrium analysis, inventory theory, and the economics of information and innovation. He was one of the first economists to note the existence of a learning curve, and he also showed that under certain conditions an economy reaches a general equilibrium. In 1972, together with Sir John Hicks, he received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for his pioneering contributions to general equilibrium theory and welfare theory. In addition to the Nobel Prize, he has received the American Economic Association’s John Bates Clark Medal. Professor Arrow is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine. He received a BS from City College and an MA and PhD from Columbia University, and he holds approximately twenty honorary degrees.

Colin F. Camerer, California Institute of Technology

Colin Camerer is the Rea and Lela Axline Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of Technology (located in Pasadena, California), where he teaches cognitive psychology and economics. He earned an MBA in finance and a PhD in decision theory from the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. Before coming to Caltech in 1994, Professor Camerer worked at the Kellogg, Wharton, and University of Chicago business schools. He studies both behavioral and experimental economics. His most recent books include Behavioral Game Theory (Princeton University Press, 2003), Foundations of Human Sociality, with fourteen co-authors (Oxford University Press, 2004), and Advances in Behavioral Economics, co-edited with George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin (Princeton University Press, 2004).

Neil Doherty, The Wharton School

Neil Doherty is the Frederick H. Ecker Professor of Insurance and Risk Management and past chair of the Department of Insurance and Risk Management at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. His principal area of interest is corporate risk management, with a focus on financial strategies for managing risks that traditionally have been insurable. Such strategies include the use of existing derivatives, the design of new financial products, and the use of capital structure. Professor Doherty has written three books in this area—Corporate Risk Management: A Financial Exposition (McGraw Hill, 1985), The Financial Theory of Insurance Pricing, with S. D’Arcy (1987), and Integrated Risk Management (McGraw Hill, 2000)—as well as several recent papers. His other areas of interest include the economics of risk and information, adverse selection, the value of information, and the design of insurance contracts with imperfect

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