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Thinking about choice in terms of plans designed to achieve multiple goals (see the analogy with foggy minefields in the chapter by Hogarth in this book) leads the analyst to consider the relevance of some broad classes of goals that might be hard to cement into a definite utility function governing tradeoffs—in particular, emotion goals, social goals, and intergenerational goals. It also leads to a series of new descriptive/normative questions. For example, how does “pure time preference” (discounting the future because of impatience: “What I can consume today matters much more than what I would be able to consume two years from now because this seems too far from me to matter”) vary among different goal categories? To what extent should observed variation in impatience for different goals be taken into account in economic projections concerning the present value of future income, achievements, health, and so on? Similarly, how are different goals downweighted in the face of uncertainty? Should observed differences in risk acceptance for different goal categories be taken into account in assessing “expectations” relative to a proposed plan? Finally, are goals themselves subject to criticism? Traditional utility theory permits any tastes whatever; but actual prescriptive advice sometimes criticizes bad taste or even the wisdom or the morality of some goals.

Emotion Goals

Consider individual choices to buy insurance. People frequently justify insuring even against small losses by saying that they are “buying peace of mind.” Reduction of acute and chronic anxiety and avoidance of regret (e.g., “I should have bought insurance”) are prominent examples of emotion goals. While such goals may be viewed as rational, decision making may be flawed either because decision makers momentarily assign very high values to an emotion goal (e.g., purchasing flight insurance at the airport even though such insurance is typically very much overpriced given the very small probability of a crash) or because they overlook less expensive ways of achieving the goal (e.g., purchasing general accident insurance).

Decisions could be aided by re-valuing emotion goals in a different frame and by making more salient alternative plans for dealing with strong emotion. Advertisers often evoke strong emotion in order to sell their products; therefore, standards for consumer-friendly advertising could also be helpful.

Social Goals

People form a multitude of affiliations, including ones that endure (devotion to friends, to family, to colleagues, to religion, to country, to social or professional organizations, etc.) and ones that are quite transient (a brief sexual fling or an even briefer conversation in a hotel elevator). The human tendency to form numerous affiliations, varying greatly in strength as well as duration, sets our species apart from other social animals.

Social goals are goals that connect closely with some particular affiliation. Examples include (a) goals connected directly with affiliation, (b) role and/or status aspirations within a group, (c) role and/or status obligations arising when one has achieved a desired role or status goal, and (d) goals held on behalf of others.1

Social goals have powerful effects on decision making. I believe that it is futile to analyze reciprocation or cooperation without taking into account social rewards and punishments in addition to economic payoffs. Some theories attempt to deal with social goals in terms of a personality variable (“altruism” or “social value orientation”). Such approaches do not take into account the relation between social goals and affiliation. People have many different affiliations, with different strengths, and with specific social goals, such as status aspirations or role obligations, derived from each affiliation. “Personality” is even less fixed than preference.

Within the complex panoply of social goals, I’d like to focus on one subtype: adherence to standards.2 In thinking about our socioeconomic