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Irrational Economist_ Making Decisions in a Dangerous World - Erwann Michel-Kerjan [36]

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may result from the plan, at every point in time; then weights the utilities by probabilities to take account of uncertainty; and, finally, evaluates the plan in terms of such a weighted sum. My arguments indicate the need for a broader standard of rationality. Why should the standard not change? Even standards of mathematical proof changed in the millennia separating Euclid from Hilbert, and they are still not quite settled. I see no reason why Plato’s standard of rationality—or its modern economic versions, for that matter—should not also change in the face of increased knowledge of decision making, especially knowledge about choice construction and context-dependent social goals.

In the twentieth century, American philosophers Nelson Goodman and John Rawls developed the concept of reflective equilibrium: Intuitions about correct inductive reasoning (Goodman) or about justice (Rawls) are part of the raw material from which philosophical analyses are built. A philosophical principle that negates strongly held intuitions about correct induction or about justice should be modified; yet an intuition that conflicts with a compelling principle must also be modified. The principles and the intuitions end up in equilibrium. Similarly, principles of rational choice should be in equilibrium with intuitions about how wise choices are made.

Designs for decision do change. Probability came into decision making in the seventeenth century; geographical information systems, in the twentieth. Maximization of subjective expected utility is not the standard of rationality, but it is nonetheless an extremely useful tool. When and how best to use it are still subject to advances in knowledge.

RECOMMENDED READING


Carlson, K., C. Janiszewski, R. Keeney, D. H. Krantz, H. Kunreuther, M. F. Luce, J. E. Russo, S. Osselaer, and D. Winterfeldt (2008). “A Theoretical Framework for Goal-Based Choice and for Prescriptive Analysis. Marketing Letters 19: 241-254.

Goodman, N. (1955/1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Krantz, D. H., and H. C. Kunreuther (2007). “Goals and Plans in Decision Making.” Judgment and Decision Making 2: 137-168.

Krantz, D. H., N. D. Peterson, P. Arora, K. Milch, and B. S. Orlove (2008). “Individual Values and Social Goals in Environmental Decision Making.” In T. Kugler, J. C. Smith, T. Connelly, and Y.-J. Son, eds., Decision Modeling and Behavior in Uncertain and Complex Environments. New York: Springer.

Nickerson, C., N. Schwarz, E. Diener, and D. Kahneman (2003). “Zeroing In on the Dark Side of the American Dream: A Closer Look at the Negative Consequences of the Goal for Financial Success.” Psychological Science 14: 531-536.

8

What If You Know You Will Have to Explain Your Choices to Others Afterwards?

Legitimation in Decision Making

PAUL R. KLEINDORFER

Legitimation refers to the process and consequences of explaining our choices to others. The anticipation that one may be required to explain or justify decisions after the fact might be expected to affect the decisions that are made.1 A short summary of the descriptive theory of legitimation could be stated as follows: If a decision maker knows he or she is being observed while making a decision, this will have predictable effects on the process and outcomes of decision making. The parallel prescriptive theory of legitimation supports the notion that it is both sensible and desirable to subject some aspects of decision making to ex post review, both to justify outcomes of choice and to provide affected stakeholders with assurance that their interests have been considered. In this chapter, I examine a few of the underlying strands of research that have addressed descriptive and prescriptive theories of legitimation and then briefly note the challenges of legitimating policies related to climate change.

INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING AND LEGITIMATION


The idea that being observed in the act of decision making could affect decisions is a very old one. One need only consider the importance of mother-child

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