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So, what are we talking about here? About the fact that Maskhadov’s assassination was a direct result of his peace efforts last winter. He signed his own death warrant by seizing the peace initiative, if only briefly.

To all appearances, Maskhadov was very seriously preparing to declare a unilateral ceasefire, which he believed should be timed for the beginning of contacts between Akhmed Zakayev’s group and the Soldiers’ Mothers in London, as a sign of goodwill on the part of one of the warring parties. The ceasefire would be extended to coincide with Gross’s round table in Brussels.

In order to achieve a real armistice, however, Maskhadov needed to reach agreement with the principal actor in the Chechen War, Basayev. Accordingly, on November 13, 2005 Basayev, summoned by Maskhadov, appeared at No. 2 Suvorov Street and stayed for six days. There is some lack of clarity about dates in the case materials, where it is asserted both that Maskhadov moved to Tolstoy-Yurt on November 17, and also that on November 13 Basayev came to visit him there. Our information is that Basayev stayed in Tolstoy-Yurt from December 13.

He stayed for six days, and the amount of time they spent together is very important. In the first place it refutes rumors that Maskhadov and Basayev never stayed in the same place, let alone for so long, in order not to be killed simultaneously. But the fact is a fact: they remained together in a very small residence.

From the testimony of one of the witnesses: “He (Basayev) stayed for about six days in the old house (at that time the owner, Musa Yusupov, had two houses standing on a plot of 1,500 square metres: an old adobe house, and a new stone house). He and Maskhadov were together all the time and talked at length. When they were together they did not allow anybody else near.”

In the second place, those six days spent in conversation are clear proof that Basayev had no wish at all for a truce. Maskhadov did not let him off the hook and succeeded in bringing him round; Basayev deferred to Maskhadov and the truce was more or less observed by Basayev’s men. As even the official media later stated, explosions in early summer 2005 were the work only of malcontents taking revenge. These had long been a third, and very serious, force in Chechnya, taking orders neither from Maskhadov nor from Basayev.

Agreement to observe a ceasefire was achieved between Maskhadov and Basayev. This raises an agonising question, to which for the present we have no answer: if Maskhadov was able to influence Basayev in this matter, why did he not do so over Beslan? Why did Maskhadov not use all his influence to prevent the seizure of the children?

As the evidence of one of the witnesses relates: “Maskhadov also told me in conversation that the seizure of Beslan had been a mistake. He was very displeased about it.” A “mistake”? Not a catastrophe?

Now, some accompanying detail about the last months of Maskhadov’s life, which also tells us a lot. Would it have been possible for the federal forces to have arrested Maskhadov and Basayev earlier? Were they within their reach? Judge for yourselves, for instance, from the manner in which both were travelling around Chechnya last winter when, supposedly, everything had long ago been brought under control and, supposedly, operations were “constantly being mounted to track down those guilty of the Beslan tragedy.”

This from the testimony of one of the witnesses: “November 17, 2004. During the night we went to a meeting (with Maskhadov, near Avtury). We drove into Soviet Farm No. 4 at approximately 2130 hours. Some 200 metres from the bus stop we stopped the car, flashed the lights two or three times, and approximately two minutes after this a car standing at the bus stop drove off in the direction of Mozdok. (At the bus stop) stood Vakhid and Viskhan, who are distant relatives of Maskhadov, and Maskhadov himself. Beside them were five or so large bags. They had at least three rifles