Is Journalism Worth Dying For__ Final Dispatches - Anna Politkovskaya [57]
In the second place, Kadyrov is not a mufti, since there already is a living mufti, Mahomed-Bashir-hadji Arsanukayev, elected in 1992 in accordance with Chechen custom at a council of ulema (delegates from all districts). Arsanukayev, one of the Republic’s most eminent theologians, fell into disfavor with President Dudayev for cursing his actions in dividing the Chechen people. The history of the rise of Kadyrov as a counterweight to Arsanukayev is that in August 1995 a famous assembly of the major field commanders took place in Vedeno. Here Dudayev proclaimed the founding of a new state, the Islamic Republic of Ichkeria. He next proclaimed Kadyrov Mufti, who until then had been a little-known and unpopular mullah. Kadyrov was, however, agreeable to declaring jihad on Russia. The appointment was contrary to Chechen tradition, and accordingly the population came to regard Kadyrov as no more than a kind of chaplain or mufti for the field commanders. From February 1996 Kadyrov orchestrated the persecution in Chechnya of all members of the Arsanukayev Muftiate. Mullahs have been mercilessly abducted and killed and the elected Muftiate destroyed. Presidents Dudayev, Yandarbiev, and subsequently Maskhadov several times reconfirmed Kadyrov’s status without consulting the ulema.
Maskhadov rewarded him with several oil tankers and oil wells in the Nozhai-Yurt and Grozny Rural Districts, enabling Kadyrov to become extremely rich and maintain a large detachment of well-armed mercenaries. In the spring of 1999 one of the periodical redistributions of influence began between the members of Chechnya’s ruling elite, and Kadyrov fell out with Shamil Basayev who was encroaching on his oil interests. This was the real reason behind Kadyrov’s condemnation of Basayev’s incursion into Dagestan [which the Russian Government used to justify beginning the Second Chechen War]. The split between them deepened, and in August 1999 Maskhadov relieved Kadyrov of the post of Mufti. Kadyrov refused to acknowledge this and to this day considers himself the Mufti of Chechnya, having now switched sides to support the federals, the very people on whom he had declared jihad.
Yakub Deniev, who until he retired on June 20 was the Acting Head of the Provisional Administration, having worked as such for eight months of the war, says, “Kadyrov is the worst possible option for Chechnya. His appointment is an insult and a humiliation for most Chechens and a slap in the face for the clergy. There is no getting away from the fact that he is a brigand. Indeed, the appointment of Kadyrov is a signal that the military phase of the operation will be continued and escalated. There is absolutely no desire for peace in Moscow at present and Kadyrov feels at home in conflict. His policies aim to deepen the divisions within Chechnya. One does of course come across confrontational individuals, but Kadyrov breaks every record in that respect.”
What does the Kremlin need all this for? What does it hope to achieve by these provocations? We appear to be facing a transition to a new phase of what it calls the “counter-terrorist operation.” Since the guerrilla warfare shows no signs of slackening and the sore tooth which is Chechnya can’t be extracted by military means, the intention seems to be to destroy Chechnya by the tried and trusted method of sowing internecine strife.
The West will turn a blind eye, taking the view that “they are just fighting among themselves,” and nobody in Russia will be particularly bothered by the slaughter, even though it has been instigated from above.
SKETCHES FOR A PORTRAIT OF AKHMAT-HADJI KADYROV
September 16, 2002
The “Chief of Chechnya,” Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov, controls his own illegal armed group which engages in abductions, and which also has a private prison in the village of