It Is Dangerous to Be Right When the Government Is Wrong - Andrew P. Napolitano [94]
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Conclusion
Let us now rekindle King’s dream with renewed vigor and petition the government to right all of its wrongs. In his famous speech, Dr. King posed the following question to his audience, and I now pose it to you: “When will you be satisfied?” Will it be while our government tortures suspects? Will it be while the government can take away our economic liberties, and hence our ability to earn a livelihood, for nearly any reason it chooses? Will it be while the government can say what kind of healthy, non-abusive personal unions are entitled to legal benefits, and which are not? Will it be while a government, which has dropped an atomic bomb on innocent civilians before, is prepared to do it again? When we are asked that question, we, like Jefferson and King, must answer: “No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream.” And this time, we shall not be silenced when told that our clamoring for liberty is “impractical.”
Does the government work for us, or do we work for the government?
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Chapter 10
War . . . War . . . What Is It Good For?:
The Right to Enjoy Peace
The year was 1941. Nazi Germany had conquered most of Europe and invaded the USSR. America, having suffered through the Great War and the Great Depression in the prior twenty-five years, remained staunchly opposed to intervention. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, although eager to enter the war against Germany, recognized this popular opinion and promised to remain neutral, so as to secure his reelection: “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”1 This presented an obvious problem for FDR. In order to “justify” breaking this promise and intervene in the war, he would need a strategy.
His plan? Provoke the Japanese navy into killing American sailors. On September 27th 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy entered into a mutual assistance treaty called the Tripartite Pact. The Pact required the three nations to come to each other’s aid and protection if one of the others in the Pact was attacked. In other words, if Japan attacked the United States, the United States would surely retaliate against its aggressor; in doing so, Germany would then come to Japan’s assistance. Essentially, the signing of this mutual assistance treaty gave President Roosevelt exactly what he desired: The window of opportunity to go after Germany. FDR responded to Churchill’s pleas to enter the war, “[Although] I may not [constitutionally] declare war, I may make war.”
Roosevelt had a number of ways to go about prosecuting this strategy. Shortly after the treaty between Germany, Japan, and Italy was signed, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memorandum proposal to the director of Naval Intelligence, now known as the “McCollum memo.” The memorandum explored the United States’ options when it came to potential actions taken by the Japanese in the South Pacific. The memo included an eight-part plan stating, “It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado. . . . If by [the eight-point plan] Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.”2 Demonstrating adherence to and belief in this very provocation strategy, Roosevelt fired Admiral James O. Richardson, commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, who voiced objection to the provocation plan at the White House during a discussion with the president.
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Part of this strategy involved sending U.S. ships into Japanese waters on so-called pop-up missions. FDR himself confessed, “I just want them to keep popping up