Jihad Joe_ Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam - J. M. Berger [111]
The chief effect of these two changes was to reverse the old paradigm. With the rise of the jihadist Web, religious indoctrination now tends to come first, and the decision to take part in combat comes second, if at all.
Would-be jihadists are today able to immerse themselves in a dizzying array of radical Islamic literature. They can feast on hundreds or thousands of hours of video and audio lectures by established clerics, as well as enthusiastic amateurs.
Among the amateurs, many lack a sophisticated Islamic outlook, but they excel at the Wikipedia approach to expertise. Anyone armed with Google can convince himself (and a certain number of others) that he is an expert in nearly any topic with a few weeks of concerted effort. Islamic jurisprudence may be especially vulnerable to this cut-and-paste mentality, due to its dense complexity and lack of a central religious authority to settle disputes.
Eventually, aspiring jihadists convince themselves that they too are experts, capable of deciding religious questions that have life-and-death consequences. All this can happen before the jihobbyist steps one foot overseas, as it did with Samir Khan and Zach Chesser.
Where the jihobbyists start to run into trouble is when they attempt to make the transition from talk to action. The clear passages to physical jihad are long gone, and those who wish to fight are left to their own devices.
Some succeed, but many more fail. Bryant Vinas nearly got himself killed trying to reach al Qaeda. In late 2009 five young men from the Washington, D.C., area demonstrated that not everyone is as lucky or competent as Vinas. They got arrested about a week after getting off the plane.86
Before 9/11 someone who selected himself for jihad usually did so because he was pretty damn tough. After 9/11 someone who selected himself was more likely to be a voracious reader.
When you’re fighting a war, you need foot soldiers more than poets. Whether through lack of aptitude or lack of desire, many jihobbyists simply don’t make it to the front lines. Tarek Mehanna never found a connection, if he was even trying. Ahmed Abousamra managed to get to Iraq only to return after two weeks. Yousef Al Khattab apparently just dropped out. Zach Chesser couldn’t even make it onto a plane.
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The Future of American Jihad
The journey of the American jihadist spans continents and decades. Americans of every race and cultural background have made the decision to take up arms in the name of Islam and strike a blow for what they believed to be justice.
Many who embarked on this journey took their first steps for the noblest of reasons—to lay their lives on the line in defense of people who seemed defenseless. But some chose to act for baser reasons—anger, hatred of the “other,” desire for power, or an urge toward violence.
In the early days of the movement, it was possible to be a jihadist and still be a “good” American. Fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan was seen as admirable in many quarters, including the American right—the same political movement that today harshly criticizes mainstream Muslims who are slow to condemn Hamas. Both the right and the left united to support the Muslims of Bosnia (in principle, at least), and there was no effort to police volunteers who would help them with weapons or their lives.
But there were flaws in the program. The Afghan jihad gave birth to al Qaeda, and the Bosnian jihad was deeply infiltrated by al Qaeda and other terrorist networks.
In each country, jihadists primarily (if not exclusively) targeted soldiers of an opposing military force. Today’s jihadists rarely confine themselves to military targets. They also intentionally kill civilians, including