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Muslim advocates absolutely deserve to have a voice, but they must also ask themselves whether they are—sometimes inadvertently—helping to perpetuate a counterproductive narrative about how the United States collectively treats Muslims.

CAIR follows in the footsteps of the American Muslim Council, founded by Abdurrahman Alamoudi. AMC was, in its day, as prominent as CAIR is today, but it faded from the scene after Alamoudi’s arrest for trying to assassinate the Saudi crown prince Abdullah. During his time in the spotlight, Alamoudi gave voice to the same litany of grievances and the same sometimes-explicit argument that America, as it currently exists, is fundamentally inhospitable to Muslims.

This dynamic is made more complicated by the fact that all three of the aforementioned organizations have meaningful ties to jihadist movements. The Muslim World League was Abdullah Azzam’s employer (see chapter 1), and its personnel have been linked to al Qaeda and a number of terrorist plots. Abdurrahman Alamoudi was funneling money from Osama bin Laden to Omar Abdel Rahman even as he advocated for American Muslims as head of AMC (chapter 4). And CAIR’s incorporators can be found in the personnel rolls of Hamas support groups in North America during the early 1990s.1

While acknowledging the deep complexity of this issue and the clear need for advocacy by and on behalf of American Muslims, it is important to realize that the path to radicalization begins with a rock-solid belief that Muslims are a victim class. Potential radicals do not have to look far to find reinforcement for this view. I will not belabor the point, because I think Muslims must resolve the issue themselves, and excessive input by outsiders can heighten the problem rather than ease it (as will be discussed later in this chapter). But those who encourage American Muslims to see themselves as disenfranchised victims must accept some degree of responsibility for the result.

Almost every jihadist profiled in this book started on his path with the idea that Muslims are being attacked by non-Muslims, whether in a specific circumstance or on a global level. The line that must be crossed to proceed to military jihad requires defining those attacks as a “war on Islam” (although not everyone who uses that language means to endorse jihad). War must be met by war, and by that logic, people move from angry talk to violent action.

Jihadist recruiters cynically exploit aggression and atrocities committed against Muslims, as in Bosnia. Once drawn in, recruits often find the sphere of attacks on Muslims that justify an armed response quickly expands. The list of provocations starts with military violence but grows to include “economic oppression,” which is blamed for poverty in Muslim nations; the “immodest” display of women’s bodies on television, which is blamed for corrupting Muslims’ morals; and even simple insults or criticisms of Islam.

Accepting that someone, or everyone, is engaged in a war with Islam is only a precondition to the radicalization process. To complete the transaction, American jihadists will usually need one or more of the following traits:

Idealism/altruism: Many American jihadists act—in the beginning, at least—out of good intentions and the simple belief that their actions can bring about a positive change in the world. Ismail Royer is an example of someone who defends his actions with an intellectualized appeal to the better angels of our nature. Abdullah Rashid, in a simpler way, continually calls back to the basic idea of doing good. For both men, the complexity of the real world (and their real personalities) outpaced the simplicity of the stories they like to tell about themselves. Idealism burns brightly in the heart, and it is often impervious to reality.

Violent tendencies or an obsession with violence: Military jihad and terrorism are inherently violent activities. Those who become jihadists must come to terms with that violence, and some fully embrace it. In certain cases, violent