Jihad Joe_ Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam - J. M. Berger [39]
Ubaidah and Rashid met with Wilson because they wanted to buy untraceable handguns and shotguns. They wanted training in how to neutralize guards, how to escape surveillance, rappelling, the construction of booby traps, and the use of chemical weapons. Rashid also asked for bomb detonators.
Although Ubaidah told Wilson that the training and the supplies were for Bosnia, Corrigan and other JTTF members were alarmed by the urban warfare element in Rashid’s requests and suspected that a campaign of domestic terrorism was in the works.
Many of the requests were, in fact, consistent with operations being staged in Bosnia, a real-life urban war zone. Rappelling, for instance, was prominently featured in propaganda videotapes produced in Bosnia, and there were reports of chemical weapons being used on the ground by both sides.
The guns and the detonators were a different matter. Corrigan’s sense of urgency was merited. Just how much would soon become clear.
TRAINING THE TRAINERS
Rashid returned from the Washington, D.C., meeting with new energy and a packed schedule, but his efforts to replicate Tahir’s program ran into trouble. Although he had received several leads on veterans who might be able to serve as trainers, he wasn’t able to close the deal and put together a team.
Rashid called Philips with a counterproposal—he would train nonveteran Muslim volunteers in the United States, then send the trainees along to Bosnia. Philips agreed and provided him with money to get started. “It was left for him to handle,” Philips said.46
That may not have been the wisest decision. Rashid’s first step was to open a martial arts dojo in a windowless, decrepit Brooklyn studio. With more enthusiasm than pragmatism, he lined the walls with exotic weapons: crossbows, ninja throwing stars, swords, blowguns, and nunchucks.
Out of sight, behind the flashy toys, he stockpiled rifle and shotgun ammunition and equipment for detonating explosives—but no guns or assembled bombs. He also kept a library of military manuals, including those that the marine had provided in Washington.
The search for recruits began. Siddig Ali was a skinny, fired-up Sudanese immigrant who worked as a translator for Omar Abdel Rahman. In late 1992 Siddig had been tapped to give a speech about jihad to area Muslims. After the speech, he was approached by Saffet Catovic, an American citizen of Bosnian descent with ties to Hasan Cengic. Through Catovic, Siddig was introduced to another Bosnian, who brought him to meet Rashid.47
With Siddig’s help, Rashid organized a training camp in rural Pennsylvania, where recruits from New York and Philadelphia practiced for several weekends in the frigid winter air. The group was a mix of immigrants and Americans, and they trained in martial arts, rappelling, and light weapons, including grenades and assault rifles. There were about forty members to start, which Rashid and Siddig winnowed down to ten men sufficiently fit and competent to go to Bosnia.
Although Rashid was the nominal head of the program, most of the trainees answered to Siddig Ali and also had individual allegiances to Omar Abdel Rahman—which is not to say that the sheikh was particularly pleased about the program.
Rahman grumbled to one of the trainees that he didn’t trust Siddig’s religion or his money. Unhappy about being upstaged by Rashid’s wealthy Saudi patrons, Rahman encouraged his followers to stay away from the program, without success. He also expressed skepticism that Siddig—or anyone else—was actually going to Bosnia.48
Rahman’s suspicions on the last point were well founded. Although Siddig talked about Bosnia obsessively, he was planning to take action closer to home.
Regardless, thanks to Rashid’s influence, the training was intensely focused on Bosnia at every turn. Lectures discussed the challenges of warfare on Bosnian