Jihad Joe_ Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam - J. M. Berger [83]
No evidence has emerged as of this writing to suggest that Awlaki has ever pointed a gun at a human being and pulled the trigger. His terrorist operations have been underwhelming at best, embarrassing at worst. They can still cause chaos, of course, especially when the West is willing to mobilize thousands of people and millions of dollars in response to every new terrorist strategy it sees. But overall, Awlaki’s successes have owed more to Western failures than operational brilliance.
Now consider Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden is far more influential than Awlaki simply as far as his preaching and ability to inspire. All of Awlaki’s jihadist adherents are also adherents of bin Laden, but the reverse does not necessarily apply, even with Awlaki’s recent gains.
Bin Laden doesn’t stop at getting people fired up. The Saudi kingpin of terror cut his teeth in combat against the Soviets during the Afghan jihad. His supporters may have wildly exaggerated his accomplishments during that conflict, but no one disputes that he is experienced in matters of war.
He’s even more experienced and proficient at managing terrorist operations. Osama bin Laden studies his enemy, looks for vulnerabilities, and uses that information to select a target. He spends years on surveillance and planning, and when that is done, he sends multiple teams of highly trained terrorists to carry out his plans. Bin Laden is detail oriented. During the East African embassy bombings, he pointed out where the truck bomb should be placed in Nairobi for maximum casualties.
In contrast, Awlaki attracts lunatics, points them at America, and pushes.
It’s absolutely appropriate to treat Awlaki as a serious threat. One 2010 intelligence report estimated that as many as three hundred Americans had trained with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.57 If the estimate is accurate, it would represent an unprecedented migration of Americans into the ranks of jihadists, and Awlaki was almost certainly driving that recruitment.
But the rush to anoint him as the next bin Laden may also be fueling his recent success. Awlaki’s writings and lectures were not heavily promoted on the most important terrorist forums until after AQAP publicly accepted him, and that didn’t happen until months after the media push began and then only after the United States announced he had been targeted for death.
There is no question that Awlaki’s status among terrorists was greatly enhanced by the media’s estimation of his importance. Even with that helpful push, however, it’s hard to imagine that Awlaki could ever fill the shoes of Osama bin Laden. But the end of Awlaki’s story has yet to be written, and the American imam has proved himself to be full of surprises.
10
A Diverse Threat
In the wake of September 11, more than one thousand Muslim Americans and Muslim immigrants were detained in the United States, often without charge. There were indisputable abuses.
In some cases people were arrested simply because their names came up during the investigation of the attack.1 In other cases, innocent employees of terrorist-linked charities were detained merely because of where they worked. In 2009 a court of appeals described the detention of Muslims after 9/11 as “repugnant to the Constitution and a painful reminder of some of the most ignominious chapters of our national history.”2
Yet some of the detentions were legitimate. Few Americans realized the extent of al Qaeda’s presence in the United States or the history of American involvement in jihadist activity, some of which was closely linked to terrorism. Neither the CIA nor the FBI had the slightest idea how many Americans had trained in al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan.3
It soon appeared that the most dangerous American members of al Qaeda proper had already been taken off the streets by the embassy bombings investigation. In the weeks and months that followed,