Justice_ What's the Right Thing to Do_ - Michael Sandel [85]
It may be that this persisting belief—that success should be seen as a reward for virtue—is simply a mistake, a myth whose hold we should try to dissolve. Rawls’s point about the moral arbitrariness of fortune puts it powerfully in doubt. And yet it may not be possible, politically or philosophically, to detach arguments about justice from debates about desert as decisively as Rawls and Dworkin suggest. Let me try to explain why.
First, justice often has an honorific aspect. Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honor and reward. Second, the idea that merit arises only once social institutions define their mission is subject to a complication: the social institutions that figure most prominently in debates about justice—schools, universities, occupations, professions, public offices—are not free to define their mission just any way they please. These institutions are defined, at least in part, by the distinctive goods they promote. While there is room for argument about what, at any moment, the mission of a law school or an army or an orchestra should be, it’s not the case that just anything goes. Certain goods are appropriate to certain social institutions, and to ignore these goods in allocating roles can be a kind of corruption.
We can see the way justice is entangled with honor by recalling Hopwood’s case. Suppose Dworkin is right that moral desert has nothing to do with who should be admitted. Here is the letter of rejection the law school should have sent Hopwood:16
Dear Ms. Hopwood,
We regret to inform you that your application for admission has been rejected. Please understand that we intend no offense by our decision. We do not hold you in contempt. In fact, we don’t even regard you as less deserving than those who were admitted.
It is not your fault that when you came along society happened not to need the qualities you had to offer. Those admitted instead of you are not deserving of a place, nor worthy of praise for the factors that led to their admission. We are only using them—and you—as instruments of a wider social purpose.
We realize you will find this news disappointing. But your disappointment should not be exaggerated by the thought that this rejection reflects in any way on your intrinsic moral worth. You have our sympathy in the sense that it is too bad you did not happen to have the traits society happened to want when you applied. Better luck next time.
Sincerely yours…
And here is the letter of acceptance, shorn of honorific implications, that a philosophically frank law school should send those it admits:
Dear successful applicant,
We are pleased to inform you that your application for admission has been accepted. It turns out that you happen to have the traits that society needs at the moment, so we propose to exploit your assets for society’s advantage by admitting you to the study of law.
You are to be congratulated, not in the sense that you deserve credit for having the qualities that led to your admission—you do not—but only in the sense that the winner of a lottery is to be congratulated. You are lucky to have come along with the right traits at the right moment. If you choose to accept our offer, you will ultimately be entitled to the benefits that attach to being used in this way. For this, you may properly celebrate.
You, or more likely your parents, may be tempted to celebrate in the further sense that you take this admission to reflect favorably, if not on your native endowments,