Known and Unknown_ A Memoir - Donald Rumsfeld [354]
CHAPTER 45
Hands Off the Bicycle Seat
He wasn’t on the road to Damascus, but Ambassador Bremer did appear to have had a sudden conversion on his way out of Baghdad. On May 21, 2004, one month before his departure as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and thirteen months after the end of major combat operations against Saddam, he handed a letter to my military aide, Colonel Steve Bucci, and asked him to deliver the letter to me personally when he arrived back at the Pentagon. Bucci had organized a group of senior staff officers to go to Baghdad in the first months of the CPA to strengthen the organization’s management. We were determined to contribute our most capable to the CPA effort.
Bremer’s letter recommended a review of troop levels in Iraq. In particular, he asked that we consider deploying an additional division, consisting of 25,000 to 30,000 troops, which would bring the total number of U.S. troops to over 160,000.1
Two years later, Bremer cited his letter as proof that he always thought U.S. troop levels in Iraq were too low to enable CPA’s mission to succeed. As head of the CPA, Bremer had had ample opportunity to express his opinions, and he had commented favorably on existing troop-level decisions on several occasions. In July 2003, for example, he expressed support for the proposal by CENTCOM’s General Abizaid to “reconfigure our troop profile . . . [to] get away from heavy forces towards lighter more mobile force, forces which have Special Operation skills.”2 That same month Bremer appeared on the television program Meet the Press, and host Tim Russert tried to pin him down on the troop-level issue.
“Have you asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for more American troops?” Russert inquired.
“No, I have not,” Bremer replied. “I expressed—”
“Do we need more?” Russert pressed.
“I do not believe we do,” Bremer replied. “I think the military commanders are confident we have enough troops on the ground, and I accept that analysis.”3
I was not pleased that Bremer was recommending more troops for the first time as he was on his way out of Baghdad and not in person to provide his reasoning.* Nevertheless, I treated his recommendation as a serious matter meriting the prompt attention of our most senior military officials.† Immediately after receiving it, I sent it to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, with a memo.
“Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate,” I wrote to Myers, noting that the issue had been raised by some members of Congress, by some retired generals, and now by Bremer.6 I directed Myers to have General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs of Staff review Bremer’s letter and report back to me. I also asked Myers to assess possible force requirements over the next six months.
Myers’ formal response on July 13, 2004 noted that General Abizaid “constantly evaluates the number of forces required to be successful in Iraq” and that he “believes forces in theater are adequate to perform the current tasks.”7 Myers wrote that CENTCOM’s plan anticipated a reduction of a brigade of troops by August 2004. The Chairman also noted that “a more optimistic forecast” from CENTCOM envisioned a transition to Iraqi control of security beginning in January 2005, and after which only seven U.S. brigades (the equivalent of some thirty thousand U.S. troops) would be required.8
Myers, Abizaid, and the Joint Chiefs anticipated that more troops might be needed “should the current environment change.” Myers’ memo listed “potential triggers” for such a force increase request: large-scale violent demonstrations, large-scale rioting and looting, a significant increase in attacks on coalition forces, and a general uprising in two major population areas at once.9 In fact, several months later, CENTCOM did request, and I approved, an increase of more than 20,000 troops to help