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for the foreseeable future. It did have some attractive aspects, such as an emphasis on conservation. But, after studying it, I was concerned that this kind of giant, amorphous proposal could become a “Christmas tree” in Congress—an opportunity for members to tack on amendments funding their pet projects.31 Rockefeller proposed a $100 billion “quasi-public corporation” called the Energy Independence Authority that would finance energy projects—the idea being that funds from the government would incentivize innovation in the private sector. With no guidelines, some of those loans could potentially go to people who were friends of people in the White House, and likely friends of Rockefeller’s. In short, this looked to be a political, financial, legislative, and ethical time bomb.

I suggested to the President that he ask the relevant experts in his administration to review and comment on Rockefeller’s proposal, such as the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of the Treasury, and others. When Rockefeller learned I had made the suggestion and was circulating his proposal in the White House staffing system, he became furious, convinced I was trying to scuttle his plan and sabotage him.

As it turned out, many in the administration had concerns about the proposal. Several people on the staff urged me to persuade the President not to introduce it.32 Alan Greenspan came out vocally against the plan, warning that it “creates a large potential for real or perceived corrupt practices…. There are realistically no limits to the types of projects it can assist, and virtually no limits as to the kind and amount of assistance it can offer.”33 Rockefeller resorted to his usual responses when questioned by anyone: strong-arm tactics, bullying, and anger at any who disagreed.

Around the same time, Rockefeller’s personal poll numbers were dropping, which he found inexplicable.34 Ford was differing with him on emergency funding to bail out New York City, then in a financial crisis caused by local mismanagement. This led to an unfortunate headline: “ford to city: drop dead.”35 Ford decided he did not want to oppose Rockefeller on the energy plan at the same time as he was opposing him on the New York City financial bailout.* Rockefeller led Ford to believe he had support for his energy proposal within the administration, which was hardly the case, although he may well have believed it, since few in the administration were willing to incur his wrath by disagreeing with him.

The plan’s arrival on Capitol Hill was at first heralded in the press as a triumph for the powerful Vice President against his imagined White House adversaries, a perspective undoubtedly promoted by Rockefeller.37 But support for his mammoth energy bill cooled once people read it. Not surprisingly, criticism of Ford, rather than Rockefeller, began appearing in the press, for his endorsement of what was characterized as a “horrendous mistake” and a “stunningly bad idea.”38 Congressional support evaporated steadily, until eventually a vote was held on a much-reduced version. Even that was resoundingly defeated in the House of Representatives.39

Gerald Ford, who allowed the avoidable political embarrassment to happen, wound up taking the political blame for Rockefeller’s unwillingness to work with others in the administration. Time and again over those months I would consult with Cheney about how we could deal with Rockefeller. It is amusing now to consider those who thirty years later would call Dick Cheney an “imperial vice president.”40 Back in the Ford years, Cheney and I had to deal every day with the real thing.

Not having expected to become president, Gerald Ford had to grapple repeatedly with tough questions without the tested support system most new presidents have already established over the course of their campaigns. Ford didn’t have a tested policy team or a national platform. On the other hand, Ford was also unusually free of the constraints of special interest groups and political supporters who generally help a candidate get elected, and as a