Known and Unknown - Donald Rumsfeld [359]
I also worried that an exclusive concentration of resources on fighting terrorism might invite other powers—perhaps North Korea or Iran—to challenge us by means other than terrorism. Terrorists and insurgents had become a serious threat, but there was no telling what kind of conflicts we might need to deter or defend against down the road a few years or decades hence. In short, we needed to give appropriate priority to other aspects of our national security strategy as well.
My October 2003 memo launched a useful recalibration of the administration’s strategy in the war on terror, which resulted in a somewhat greater emphasis on the nonmilitary instruments of national power. We conducted a strategic review of the global war on terror and presented several important thoughts to President Bush, including a proposal for a new U.S. information agency and a civilian reserve corps at the State Department to provide civilian partners for our military in performing stabilization missions. The key elements of our strategic review were incorporated into formal presidential directives. They became the foundation of the 2005–2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terror and helped shape the administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy.16
One phrase in my October 2003 memo gained special attention: “long, hard slog.” For some it evoked the Vietnam War and images of quagmire.17 I hadn’t intended the unflattering comparison, but I did feel we needed to caution ourselves and the American people that the broader war against Islamist extremists might last many years like the Cold War.
We had done much work we could be proud of. We were putting the pressure on al-Qaida and other Islamist terrorist groups around the world. While there had not been another attack on our country, we knew that our enemies were reorganizing as decentralized terrorist cells and as insurgent groups. They would take advantage of our troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, using the fighting there to train their next generation of terrorists. And they would use support from Syria and Iran to arm themselves. They would launch headline-grabbing attacks to try to convince the American public that our fight with them was futile, much as the Tet Offensive in Vietnam had. Theirs was a waiting game. They knew that they didn’t have to win; they simply had to outlast us.
CHAPTER 46
The Dead Enders
In June 2004, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez ended his tour as commander of American forces in Iraq and was replaced by George Casey, a four-star Army general. Casey began his military career in the late 1960s in the ROTC at Georgetown University. Though Casey had planned to stay for only two years in the military before heading to law school, he felt compelled to stay in the Army as the war in Vietnam raged. The decision was a weighty one for him. His father, a major general, had been killed in a helicopter crash in Vietnam shortly after Casey was commissioned. Throughout his time in Iraq, Casey wore one of his dad’s medals around his neck as a reminder of the sacrifice.
After Sanchez’s difficult tenure, the appointment of the calm, low-key, and analytical Casey was welcomed. “Boring is good, General Casey, and I applaud you on that,” Senator Hillary Clinton told him at his confirmation hearing. “Clearly, you’re a master at it. And it goes to the heart of your success.”1
I had recommended Casey to the President at Abizaid’s urging. Casey and his superior at CENTCOM were close personally and saw the Iraq war in similar terms. They emphasized transferring responsibility to the Iraqi government and training and equipping Iraqi forces so that American forces could begin to leave in an orderly fashion. With the end of the CPA, we had returned to our original emphasis on more modest goals—keeping the nation reasonably secure and enabling the Iraqis to defeat the insurgency over time.
In contrast to the strained relationship that characterized the Bremer