Letters From Alcatraz - Michael Esslinger [173]
As Coy carefully studied the individual routines of the guard staff, he also began to select his co-conspirators. He understood that in order for the escape to be successful, his plan would require exquisite orchestration, as well as the total commitment and cooperation of his accomplices. It is clear that his choice would fall on individuals who were capable of following a prescribed plan, and doing whatever became necessary to carry it out, even if this meant murder.
During Coy’s rounds of delivering books and magazines to inmates, he routinely stopped at cell #152 to visit Joseph Paul Cretzer, also known to many of the inmates as “Dutch.” Cretzer was an ideal choice as an accomplice and he had already proven his capabilities during an aborted escape attempt in May of 1941. That attempt had involved taking guards hostage, which was also an element of Coy’s plan. Although the previous attempt had failed, inmate Clarence Carnes stated afterward that Cretzer had kept calm when it became clear that the plan was doomed and this had won him a solid reputation with the other convicts. It is likely that Coy took this into consideration in deciding that Cretzer would make a perfect accomplice.
Carnes later commented that Coy had consistently reminded his accomplices of the virtue of patience and thorough planning. Coy had prepared himself for the day of the escape both physically and mentally, continually refining the procedures and chronology of the plan. He lost over twenty pounds by adhering to a strict diet regimen over a period of several months and improved his muscle tone and physical strength by performing exercises in his cell. He also arranged for pre-placement of the crudely fabricated tools that would be needed to spread the bars in the West End Gun Gallery. It is believed that inmate and cellhouse plumber Ed Mrozik smuggled pliers to Coy, and also assembled the makeshift bar spreader with the help of a fellow inmate in the Machine Shop.
Cellhouse Plumber Ed Mrozik.
The inmates of Alcatraz had developed a complex system for smuggling items past the elaborate security mechanisms within the prison. Inmates who risked smuggling contraband for others generally were given special payoffs or rewards. Despite the watchfulness of the correctional officers, inmates often successfully used covert networks to pass and smuggle items to one another. For example, if an inmate working in the machine shop wanted to “mail” a contraband item, he could wrap it in a soiled rag and send off to the laundry, making sure that the laundry bag carried a special secret marking. The contraband could then be folded in with clean kitchen linens and delivered to an appropriate recipient in the kitchen. Since problems such as clogged drains were common occurrences in the kitchen, the inmate plumber could intercept the smuggled item, which could be disguised as a common plumbing tool or fixture, and he could introduce it into his tool kit, thus ensuring final delivery. The security focus was generally on the inmates themselves, so these covert