Letters on England [25]
it is of little importance to religion,
which only requires the soul to be virtuous, whatever substance it
may be made of. It is a clock which is given us to regulate, but
the artist has not told us of what materials the spring of this
chock is composed.
I am a body, and, I think, that's all I know of the matter. Shall I
ascribe to an unknown cause, what I can so easily impute to the only
second cause I am acquainted with? Here all the school philosophers
interrupt me with their arguments, and declare that there is only
extension and solidity in bodies, and that there they can have
nothing but motion and figure. Now motion, figure, extension and
solidity cannot form a thought, and consequently the soul cannot be
matter. All this so often repeated mighty series of reasoning,
amounts to no more than this: I am absolutely ignorant what matter
is; I guess, but imperfectly, some properties of it; now I
absolutely cannot tell whether these properties may be joined to
thought. As I therefore know nothing, I maintain positively that
matter cannot think. In this manner do the schools reason.
Mr. Locke addressed these gentlemen in the candid, sincere manner
following: At least confess yourselves to be as ignorant as I.
Neither your imaginations nor mine are able to comprehend in what
manner a body is susceptible of ideas; and do you conceive better in
what manner a substance, of what kind soever, is susceptible of
them? As you cannot comprehend either matter or spirit, why will
you presume to assert anything?
The superstitious man comes afterwards and declares, that all those
must be burnt for the good of their souls, who so much as suspect
that it is possible for the body to think without any foreign
assistance. But what would these people say should they themselves
be proved irreligious? And indeed, what man can presume to assert,
without being guilty at the same time of the greatest impiety, that
it is impossible for the Creator to form matter with thought and
sensation? Consider only, I beg you, what a dilemma you bring
yourselves into, you who confine in this manner the power of the
Creator. Beasts have the same organs, the same sensations, the same
perceptions as we; they have memory, and combine certain ideas. In
case it was not in the power of God to animate matter, and inform it
with sensation, the consequence would be, either that beasts are
mere machines, or that they have a spiritual soul.
Methinks it is clearly evident that beasts cannot be mere machines,
which I prove thus. God has given to them the very same organs of
sensation as to us: if therefore they have no sensation, God has
created a useless thing; now according to your own confession God
does nothing in vain; He therefore did not create so many organs of
sensation, merely for them to be uninformed with this faculty;
consequently beasts are not mere machines. Beasts, according to
your assertion, cannot be animated with a spiritual soul; you will,
therefore, in spite of yourself, be reduced to this only assertion,
viz., that God has endued the organs of beasts, who are mere matter,
with the faculties of sensation and perception, which you call
instinct in them. But why may not God, if He pleases, communicate
to our more delicate organs, that faculty of feeling, perceiving,
and thinking, which we call human reason? To whatever side you
turn, you are forced to acknowledge your own ignorance, and the
boundless power of the Creator. Exclaim therefore no more against
the sage, the modest philosophy of Mr. Locke, which so far from
interfering with religion, would be of use to demonstrate the truth
of it, in case religion wanted any such support. For what
philosophy can be of a more religious nature than that, which
affirming nothing but what it conceives clearly, and conscious of
its own weakness, declares that we must always have recourse to God
in
which only requires the soul to be virtuous, whatever substance it
may be made of. It is a clock which is given us to regulate, but
the artist has not told us of what materials the spring of this
chock is composed.
I am a body, and, I think, that's all I know of the matter. Shall I
ascribe to an unknown cause, what I can so easily impute to the only
second cause I am acquainted with? Here all the school philosophers
interrupt me with their arguments, and declare that there is only
extension and solidity in bodies, and that there they can have
nothing but motion and figure. Now motion, figure, extension and
solidity cannot form a thought, and consequently the soul cannot be
matter. All this so often repeated mighty series of reasoning,
amounts to no more than this: I am absolutely ignorant what matter
is; I guess, but imperfectly, some properties of it; now I
absolutely cannot tell whether these properties may be joined to
thought. As I therefore know nothing, I maintain positively that
matter cannot think. In this manner do the schools reason.
Mr. Locke addressed these gentlemen in the candid, sincere manner
following: At least confess yourselves to be as ignorant as I.
Neither your imaginations nor mine are able to comprehend in what
manner a body is susceptible of ideas; and do you conceive better in
what manner a substance, of what kind soever, is susceptible of
them? As you cannot comprehend either matter or spirit, why will
you presume to assert anything?
The superstitious man comes afterwards and declares, that all those
must be burnt for the good of their souls, who so much as suspect
that it is possible for the body to think without any foreign
assistance. But what would these people say should they themselves
be proved irreligious? And indeed, what man can presume to assert,
without being guilty at the same time of the greatest impiety, that
it is impossible for the Creator to form matter with thought and
sensation? Consider only, I beg you, what a dilemma you bring
yourselves into, you who confine in this manner the power of the
Creator. Beasts have the same organs, the same sensations, the same
perceptions as we; they have memory, and combine certain ideas. In
case it was not in the power of God to animate matter, and inform it
with sensation, the consequence would be, either that beasts are
mere machines, or that they have a spiritual soul.
Methinks it is clearly evident that beasts cannot be mere machines,
which I prove thus. God has given to them the very same organs of
sensation as to us: if therefore they have no sensation, God has
created a useless thing; now according to your own confession God
does nothing in vain; He therefore did not create so many organs of
sensation, merely for them to be uninformed with this faculty;
consequently beasts are not mere machines. Beasts, according to
your assertion, cannot be animated with a spiritual soul; you will,
therefore, in spite of yourself, be reduced to this only assertion,
viz., that God has endued the organs of beasts, who are mere matter,
with the faculties of sensation and perception, which you call
instinct in them. But why may not God, if He pleases, communicate
to our more delicate organs, that faculty of feeling, perceiving,
and thinking, which we call human reason? To whatever side you
turn, you are forced to acknowledge your own ignorance, and the
boundless power of the Creator. Exclaim therefore no more against
the sage, the modest philosophy of Mr. Locke, which so far from
interfering with religion, would be of use to demonstrate the truth
of it, in case religion wanted any such support. For what
philosophy can be of a more religious nature than that, which
affirming nothing but what it conceives clearly, and conscious of
its own weakness, declares that we must always have recourse to God
in