Loon - Jack McLean [33]
Each United States Marine headed for Vietnam in 1967 was required to watch a training film during the final days prior to embarkation. It was titled Why Vietnam and featured, among others, President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In it, they explained exactly why we were headed halfway around the world to a country few of us had ever heard of, to defend the United States of America against a growing ideology that fewer of us understood, let alone perceived as a threat.
“Why Vietnam,” Johnson began.
I’ve never forgotten it. Even then—in the summer of 1967, when we believed that we could win this war, when we believed that our government was doing the right thing—even then, the film brought quiet laughs from many in the audience. Filmed eighteen months earlier, the celluloid propaganda already was out of date. The entire geopolitical situation in Vietnam, the United States, and, indeed, the world had changed, and changed dramatically. The war that I was heading to bore little resemblance to the war these men were discussing. The NVA were now an acknowledged power and arguably a superior force. Since the film had been made, 8,238 American boys had died. Not surprisingly, seven months later, Johnson’s complete mismanagement of the war would force him from office.
Why Vietnam, indeed.
During the film, Johnson and his crew spoke of the domino theory. That is to say, if Vietnam fell to the Communists, then, like a row of falling dominos, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and God knew where else would ultimately fall as well. It was the middle of the cold war. The stakes were high. Around the world, missiles with atomic warheads bulged in their silos, itching for ignition. The Russians were Communists and bad. The Chinese were Communists and bad, but not friendly with the Russians, which made it confusing. The North Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Cubans were all Communists. Though the situation (save Cuba) had remained static for fifteen years, the United States of America had decided to draw the line in Vietnam. Unfortunately, as we would all learn later, the reasons that President Johnson outlined as causes for the invasion of South Vietnam were entirely fabricated.
One of the reasons for the war stemmed from an August 2, 1964, incident in the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam. That evening, the North Vietnamese Navy allegedly launched several unprovoked torpedo attacks on the U.S. destroyer Maddox, said to be on routine patrol. Two days later, after another alleged attack, President Johnson went on national TV to announce that he had ordered retaliatory action against the gunboats and supporting facilities in North Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—the closest thing there was to a declaration of war against North Vietnam—sailed through Congress on August 7, 1964, with dissent from only Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon and Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska. The resolution gave congressional authorization for the commander in chief to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” It was to expire “when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured.…”
President Johnson had addressed Congress two days before, outlining his four reasons for escalation in Vietnam:
America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.
The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.
Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.
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