Manufacturing Consent_ The Political Economy of the Mass Media - Edward S. Herman [257]
73. John S. Saloma III, Ominous Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984), p. 79.
74. MacDougall, Ninety Seconds, pp. 116–17.
75. Thomas B. Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality (New York: Norton, 1984), p. 110.
76. Peggy Dardenne, “Corporate Advertising,” Public Relations Journal (November 1982), p. 36.
77. S. Prakash Sethi, Handbook of Advocacy Advertising: Strategies and Applications (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 22. See also Edsall, New Politics, chapter 3, “The Politicization of the Business Community”; and Saloma, Ominous Politics, chapter 6, “The Corporations: Making Our Voices Heard.”
78. The April 14, 1986, U.S. bombing of Libya was the first military action timed to preempt attention on 7 P.M. prime-time television news. See Chomsky, Pirates & Emperors, p. 147.
79. For the masterful way the Reagan administration used these to manipulate the press, see “Standups,” The New Yorker, December 2, 1985, pp. 81ff.
80. Fishman, Manufacturing the News, p. 153.
81. See note 70.
82. On January 16, 1986, the American Friends Service Committee issued a news release, based on extended Freedom of Information Act inquiries, which showed that there had been 381 navy nuclear-weapons accidents and “incidents” in the period 1965–77, a figure far higher than that previously claimed. The mass media did not cover this hot story directly but through the filter of the navy’s reply, which downplayed the significance of the new findings and eliminated or relegated to the background the AFSC’s full range of facts and interpretation of the meaning of what they had uncovered. A typical heading: “Navy Lists Nuclear Mishaps: None of 630 Imperilled Public, Service Says,” Washington Post, January 16, 1986.
83. The Harvard professor in charge of the program, Harvey Mansfield, stated that the invitation to White had been a mistake anyway, as he “is a representative of the far left,” whereas the forum was intended to involve a debate “between liberals and conservatives” (Harvard Crimson, May 14, 1986).
84. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), pp. 123–24.
85. Mark Hertsgaard, “How Reagan Seduced Us: Inside the President’s Propaganda Factory,” Village Voice, September 18, 1984; see also “Standups,” cited in note 79 above.
86. Stephen L. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 194.
87. Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978), p. 7.
88. See Edward S. Herman, “The Institutionalization of Bias in Economics,” Media, Culture and Society (July 1982), pp. 275–91.
89. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 28.
90. Quoted in Alex Carey, “Managing Public Opinion: The Corporate Offensive” (University of New South Wales, 1986, mimeographed), p. 32.
91. Ibid., pp. 46–47, quoting Feulner papers given in 1978 and 1985.
92. For a good discussion of many of these organizations and their purpose, funding, networking, and outreach programs, see Saloma, Ominous Politics, chapters 4, 6, and 9.
93. See Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, p. 259; Fred Landis, “Georgetown’s Ivory Tower for Old Spooks,” Inquiry, September 30, 1979, pp. 7–9.
94. The CSIS’s expert on terrorism, Robert Kupperman, was probably the most widely used participant on radio and television talk shows on terrorism in the last several years.
95. On Sterling’s qualifications as an expert, see Herman and Brodhead, Bulgarian Connection, pp. 125–46; on Shevchenko, see Edward J. Epstein, “The Invention of Arkady Shevchenko, Supermole: The Spy Who Came In to Be Sold,” New Republic, July 15–22, 1985.
96. See