Manufacturing Consent_ The Political Economy of the Mass Media - Edward S. Herman [293]
93. Pringle, FEER, February 25, 1988; Crossette, New York Times, April 1, 1988. Holbrooke, quoted in Indochina Issues (June 1985). See also Robert Manning, South (September 1984), and Elizabeth Becker, “U.S. Backs Mass Murderer,” Washington Post, May 22, 1983, on U.S. pressures to force the non-Communist resistance “into an ignominious coalition with Pol Pot.” Dith Pran, quoted by Jack Colhoun, Guardian (New York), June 5, 1985. Hawk, letter, FEER, August 2, 1984, with a picture of Alexander Haig “meeting, drink in hand, a smiling Ieng Sary” (Khmer Rouge foreign minister) in New York.
94. Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 379.
95. Chanthou Boua, “Observations of the Heng Samrin Government,” in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath.
96. Our own expressed view at the time was that “the Vietnamese invasion can be explained, but it cannot be justified” (PEHR, II, preface, xix). With the information that has since appeared about the Pol Pot terror in 1977–78 and the border attacks against Vietnam, that judgment might have to be qualified, even in terms of a rather restrictive interpretation of the right of self-defense under international law.
97. London Guardian, October 26, 1984.
98. Abrams, letter, New York Times, January 8, 1985; also Abrams and Diane Orentlicher, Washington Post Weekly, September 9, 1985. Hawk, New Republic, November 15, 1982; Economist, October 13, 1984; O’Brien, London Observer, September 30, 1984.
99. Quality of Mercy; Washington Post, September 2, 1984; his article in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath.
100. Quality of Mercy, p. 55; Washington Post, September 2, 1984.
101. It is concocted from a series of phrases that appear in various places in the introduction to volume 1 of PEHR, pp. 19–20, with crucial omissions—not noted—that would at once demonstrate the absurdity of the argument he presents.
102. Cited by Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 58f., in a discussion of Shawcross’s subsequent effort “to efface his earlier good judgment and claim to have been a purveyor of a sensationalist STV, when he clearly was not.”
103. Shawcross may indeed have had other motives; see note 33.
104. See author’s preface, American edition of Ponchaud’s Cambodia: Year Zero. On Ponchaud’s remarkable deception concerning this matter, see PEHR, II.6, 278f.
105. For a record based on further inquiry, see PEHR, II.6, 253–84.
106. See note 79 above.
107. To be precise, we have found one suggestion, although well after the event. In The Times Higher Education Supplement, December 6, 1981, along with a series of falsifications of our position of the sort discussed here, Shawcross states that given our “political influence,” we could have played an important part in mobilizing world opinion to bring pressure on China to call off Khmer Rouge atrocities—as he was no doubt desperately trying to do, but failing, because of his lack of outreach comparable to ours. Comment should be superfluous. Evidently the editors of the journal so believed, refusing publication of a response, despite our awesome “political influence.” It seems doubtful that Shawcross would have published such childish absurdities had he not been assured that no response would be permitted.
108. Quality of Mercy, p. 357.
109. Review of Quality of Mercy, Washington Post Weekly, July 30, 1984, Book World.
110. See his essay in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath, his only attempt to provide evidence for his widely heralded claims.
111. New Statesman, November 2, 1984. On the question of whether DK was “Marxist-Leninist”—whatever that is supposed to mean, exactly—see Vickery, Cambodia.
112. The opening pages of our chapter on Cambodia in PEHR, II, 135–36. For some of our comments in the article in question, see pp. 271–72, above.
113. See references of note 22.
114. Quality of Mercy, p. 357.
115. Ibid., pp. 358–59; New York Review of Books, September 27, 1984. We emphasize that the correctness of