Manufacturing Consent_ The Political Economy of the Mass Media - Edward S. Herman [300]
55. Article VI and Article IV(2), respectively, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968; the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970. The important preamble to the NPT recalled state parties obligation under the UN Charter to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” adding that the “establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources . . . .”
56. See, e.g., National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015 (Washington DC, December 2000); U.S. Space Command, Vision for 2020 (February 1997), 7; Pentagon, Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.
57. U.S. Strategic Command, Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence, 1995 (released under a Freedom of Information Act request by Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project). In Section C, “Keeping our options open and our determination clear,” this document stated: “We must be ambiguous about details of our response (or preemption) if what we value is threatened, but it must be clear that our actions would have terrible consequences . . . . Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the U.S. may do to an adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially ‘out of control’ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.”
58. See Ian Traynor, “Pre-emptive nuclear strike a key option, NATO told,” Guardian, January 22, 2008.
59. See James C. Dao, “Senate Panel Votes to Lift Ban on Small Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, May 10, 2003.
60. Martin van Creveld, “Is Israel planning to attack Iran?” International Herald Tribune, August 21, 2004. Of course, other reasons for the U.S. and U.K. attack on Iraq besides weapons of mass destruction do come to mind.
61. Michael MccGwire, “The Rise and Fall of the NPT,” International Affairs 81 (January, 2005).
62. Ibid.
63. David E. Sanger, “Threats Shadow New Conference on Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, May 1, 2005.
64. Between the IAEA’s publication of the very first of its written reports on Iran’s implementation of its obligations under the NPT (GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003), and the most current report in the series at the time of this writing, in midsummer 2008 (GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008), the IAEA has published a total of 22 different written reports.
65. We base these claims on searches of both the NewsBank and Nexis databases for the first 10 days following the release of each NAM statement related to the Iran nuclear issue (May 30, 2006 and July 30, 2008). As noted, the one significant exception to the U.S. news media’s general rule of zero-coverage was George Jahn, “Nonaligned countries back Iran’s nuclear program,” Associated Press, July 30, 2008.
APPENDIX 1
1. On Penniman’s background, and for a study of his methods as an observer, see “Penniman on South Vietnamese Elections: The Observer-Expert as Promoter-Salesman,” in Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and