Manufacturing Consent_ The Political Economy of the Mass Media - Edward S. Herman [92]
In Guatemala, too, the endemic fear based on years of unconstrained and continuing army violence was a dominant fact of national life. According to Americas Watch, writing in early 1985,
Torture, killings, and disappearances continue at an extraordinary rate, and millions of peasants remain under the strict scrutiny and control of the government through the use of civil patrols and “model villages.” Guatemala remains, in short, a nation of prisoners.57
The law group described Guatemala in 1985 as “a country where the greater part of the people live in permanent fear.”58
In the case of Nicaragua, we repeat the central fact that differentiates it from the U.S. client states: in 1984 its government was not murdering civilians.59 The main fear of ordinary citizens in Nicaragua was of violence by the contras and the United States.
Our conclusion is that the fifth condition for a free election was met in Nicaragua, but not in El Salvador and Guatemala. And our overall finding is that neither El Salvador nor Guatemala met any of the five basic conditions of a free election, whereas Nicaragua met some of them well, others to a lesser extent.
3.3. THE COERCION PACKAGES IN EL SALVADOR,
GUATEMALA, AND NICARAGUA
As we noted, in the U.S. government’s sponsored elections, voter turnout is interpreted as public support for the election and its sponsors. In disapproved elections (here, Nicaragua), this frame is abandoned, and voter turnout is either ignored or declared meaningless because of limited options or coercive threats by the authorities. But the question of coercive threats should clearly be raised in all cases where this is a potential problem. As we have just described, the elections in El Salvador were held under conditions of military rule where mass killings of “subversives” had taken place and a climate of fear had been established. If the government then sponsors an election and the local military authorities urge people to vote, a significant part of the vote should be assumed to be a result of built-in coercion. A propaganda model would anticipate that the U.S. mass media make no such assumption, and they did not.
In El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, voting was also required by law. The law stipulated that failure to vote was to be penalized by a specific monetary assessment, and it also called on local authorities to check out whether voters did in fact vote. This could be done because at the time of voting one’s identification card (ID, cédula) was stamped, acknowledging the casting of a vote. Anybody stopped by the army and police would have to show the ID card, which would quickly indicate whether the individual had carried out his or her patriotic duty. Just prior to the March 1982 election, Minister of Defense García warned the population in the San Salvador newspapers that the failure to vote would be regarded as an act of treason. And in the 1984 election, “Advertising by the government and military prior to the elections stressed the obligation to vote rather than the freedom to vote.”60 Given the climate of fear, the voting requirement, the ID stamp, the army warning, and the army record in handling “traitors,” it is evident that the coercive element in generating turnout in Salvadoran elections has been large. This is supported by queries made by independent observers on the reasons why Salvadorans voted.61
In Guatemala, as in El Salvador, voting was required by law; nonvoters were subject to a fine of five quetzales ($1.25). Also, as in El Salvador, newspaper ads sponsored by the army asserted that it was treasonous to fail to vote or to vote null or blank.62 The law group reported that “many” people expressed fears that nonvoting would subject them to reprisals, and after