Men Who Killed Qantas - Matthew Benns [29]
The Australian Department of Civil Aviation’s expert on Super Constellations, Jim Brough, investigated the crash. The failure of engine number three to reach full power had precipitated the accident. But it was the failure of the flight engineer to call out a warning in time and then the captain’s delay in applying reverse thrust and full braking power that had greatly contributed to the ensuing accident. On receipt of the comprehensive report, the department’s director-general, Donald Anderson, said: ‘This was a “cheap” accident for Qantas … the important thing is to ensure the company acknowledges the weaknesses involved in bringing it about and is made to see it was completely avoidable.’4
His comments could so easily have applied to the runway overrun in Bangkok 39 years later, in which an even bigger jet would have remarkably similar problems, as described in chapter 1. Had Qantas learned anything from the mistakes of the past? As crash investigator Macarthur Job pointed out in his flight safety report on the 1960 crash: ‘Spared what could so easily have been tragic consequences by a frighteningly slim margin, Qantas’s public composure seemed unaffected. But behind the scenes the accident was a serious affront to the airline’s pride after so many years of accident-free flying – especially so in light of its expanding jet network.’5
It was ironic that almost at exactly the same moment the Super Constellation VH-EAC Southern Wave was burning on the end of a runway in Mauritius, the Australian Minister for Civil Aviation, Senator Shane Paltridge, was tabling the Qantas Annual Report for 1959–60 extolling its safety record. The report boasted that the airline had flown 238 million kilometres since 1946 without a major incident or fatality. However, the families of the seven people who died on board Qantas flight VH-EBQ on 16 July 1951 when the centre propeller of their de Havilland DHA-3 Drover failed, causing the plane to crash into the Huon Gulf near Papua New Guinea, may have had cause to argue with Senator Paltridge’s assessment.
Even before World War Two had ended, the governments, airlines and aircraft manufacturers of the allied victors were jostling for position and dominance in the newly peaceful world. Naturally the Americans thought they should run everything. The British were leaning heavily on their colonial past and pushing strongly for Australia to use British planes in partnership on the Kangaroo Route. In Australia the Curtin government was making no secret of its plans to nationalise the Australian domestic and international airlines.
Hudson Fysh continued to fight ferociously for Qantas and its future. In October 1944 he flew to London to discuss the airline’s next steps, taking one of two Qantas-owned Liberators on its regular service across the Indian Ocean. ‘Our two Libs are the world’s oldest and worst Libs on the world’s longest air hop,’ he noted.6 On arrival he discovered: ‘Britain had nothing but second-rate aircraft to offer for use on overseas routes.’7 Undaunted, Qantas decided to make do with converted Lancaster bombers until a better option became available. The nose and tail-gun turrets were stripped out and nine seated or six sleeping passengers crammed uncomfortably into the fuselage. The biggest benefit came from the four Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, which powered the planes from Sydney to London in just 67 hours – a dramatic improvement on the nine and a half days it had taken in 1939.
Qantas operated the planes from Sydney to Karachi and BOAC took over from Karachi to London. In 1946