Money Mischief_ Episodes in Monetary History - Milton Friedman [54]
Walker apparently did not regard the United States alone as equivalent to "a weak league," since he opposed Bryan's proposal that the United States unilaterally adopt bimetallism at a 16 to 1 ratio. In his "Address on International Bimetallism," which he delivered a few days after the 1896 election, Walker referred to the defeat of Bryan as "the passing of a great storm" ([1896a] 1899, 1:251). In his 1896 book, International Bimetallism, Walker expressed the view that the United States "is not and has never been in a position to exert an equal effect [to France alone] upon the market for the money metals" (1896b, p. 220). As already noted, my own examination of the empirical evidence suggests that his "has never" was an overstatement, though his "is not" was probably correct.
Writing in 1888, one of the ablest of the British economists in favor of bimetallism, J. Shield Nicholson ([1888] 1895, [>], 288), regarded the reestablishment of a ratio of 15.5 to 1 as entirely feasible if there was international agreement, agreeing in this respect with Walker. So far as I know, Nicholson did not express any view on the feasibility of unilateral adoption by Britain or the United States of a similar ratio.
Jevons is perhaps the best example of an economist who recognized the theoretical case for bimetallism yet /vigorously opposed it on practical grounds. In a letter of 1868 to a supporter of bimetallism, he summarized his views (1884, p. 306; italics in original) by saying: "I must acknowledge that in theory you and the other defenders of what may be called the alternative standard are right. But in the practical aspect the subject looks very different, and I am inclined to hope for the extension of the single gold standard." The major practical considerations he cites in the letter (pp. 305–6) are these:
I cannot see any prospect of a serious rise in the value of the precious metals.... The danger, therefore, that the value of gold would rise, and the burdens of nations become increased, is of an uncertain nature....
On the other hand, the conveniences of a single gold standard are of a tangible and certain nature. The weight of the money is decreased to the least possible amount, without the use of paper representative money. There is a simplicity and convenience about the system which has recommended it to the English during the half century which has passed since our new sovereigns were issued. The operation of our law of 1816 has, in fact, been so successful in most respects that I should despair altogether of the English people or Government ever being brought to adopt the double standard in place of it. I was glad, therefore, to see that the monetary convention had decided in favour of a single gold standard.*
Here and in other publications, Jevons places great emphasis on the inconvenience to wealthier countries of silver money because it weighs so much more than a quantity of gold of the same value. The argument presumes that a large fraction of transactions are conducted with coined money. This may have been true in his day, but it rapidly became less and less important with the wider use of token subsidiary coins, paper money, and deposits. Even in Jevons's day, it was in part true only because the Bank of England was prohibited from issuing notes of lower denomination