Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal - James D. Hornfischer [111]
Scott credited his “crude night firing practices” for the success. Mike Moran was so pleased with his ship’s performance that he overlooked the fact that some of his zealous gunners had continued firing despite Scott’s orders to cease. According to Moran, “The rapidity and accuracy of fire, fire discipline, and absence of material casualties were all without precedent in target practice. Perfect fire discipline was an especially conspicuous feature. At the orders of ‘Commence Firing’ continuous fire began instantaneously. When ordered to cease or check fire the batteries responded at once. In an action involving relatively brief bursts of fire and frequent target shifts, the importance of such positive control can scarcely be overemphasized.” Sailors of the Farenholt and Duncan, of course, thought the cruisers’ fire discipline left plenty to be desired. Captain McMorris paid the Farenholt a traditional tribute and fee. When they reached Espiritu Santo, the flagship sent over twenty gallons of ice cream—“reparations,” Ford Richardson called it. But there was no making light of the tragic mistake. Gunfire from friendly ships had killed three of the Farenholt’s men and wounded forty-three.
There was nothing sweet about the Japanese experience in a battle that in many ways resembled the American ordeal in the Battle of Savo Island: a rout by a battle-ready cruiser force over a complacent one. If Admiral Scott didn’t exact the same punishing price from Goto that Mikawa took from Bode and Riefkohl, the effect on American morale made the difference a matter of accountancy. “Throughout the ‘Night Battle off Savo Island,’ ” an official Japanese source wrote of the engagement that Americans would call the Battle of Cape Esperance, “providence abandoned us.… The future looked bleak for our surface forces, whose forte was night warfare.” For U.S. sailors who had been overawed by the Japanese prowess in night battle, here was reason to believe that the IJN was run by mortals after all.
Captain Small’s staff in the Salt Lake City drew a wide range of lessons, cataloging them in thirty-nine numbered paragraphs in the ship’s action report, covering everything from gunnery and fire control to shiphandling, repairs, and communications. Most of them could be learned only in battle:
“Restrict telephone circuits to the business at hand. Do not permit uncertainty or panic to creep in on circuits either by tone of voice or context of message.”
“It is the function of Control to search for targets. Never require the director to do so when engaged.”
“In a short-range night action, shift targets during the loading interval.”
“Stretcher bearers should remain in a darkened compartment or wear dark adaptation goggles during night battle to preserve their night vision.”
THOUGH THE U.S. NAVY had a victory to celebrate, its immediate benefit to the men on Guadalcanal would be negligible. The Reinforcement Group that had sailed ahead of Goto benefited from Scott’s preoccupation with the cruisers. Eluding detection, it reached Doma Cove on Guadalcanal’s north coast, unloaded its cargo of artillery, vehicles, men, and supplies, and escaped before the rise of morning.
And as the events of the next forty-eight hours would show, the marines of General Vandegrift’s garrison and the airmen at Henderson Field had yet to experience their most trying hour. Scott’s victory, though an invigorating boost to the spirits, would do little to stop the coming rain of fire.
(Photo Credit: P.3)
“The regular Navy enlisted man is today the highest type in our history; he is intelligent, aspiring, and has initiative, albeit a ready and cheerful susceptibility to discipline.… Properly handled, he will go through fire and water. He is not always properly handled.”
—Hanson