Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal - James D. Hornfischer [218]
The repair supervisors at Nouméa, determining that the Sterett needed structural work, made plans to send her back to Pearl. “No sooner had the repair team left,” Cal Calhoun wrote, “than we were told that Admiral Halsey himself was coming aboard to inspect our damage.” No one could have failed to recognize the bushy eyebrows, the strong chin, or the direct gaze that bespoke confidence and strength. “He shook hands with each of us,” Calhoun wrote, “and asked to be shown all of our battle damage.” Halsey listened intently as Captain Coward cataloged the cost, human and material, extracted by each hit. “From time to time he simply shook his head as we described events,” Lieutenant Calhoun wrote. By the end of the briefing, Halsey had tears in his eyes. In a low voice, he told Coward and his senior officers how proud he was of them.
“I wish I could recall his exact words,” Calhoun wrote, “but I do remember some of his thoughts—he regretted that he had to send destroyers against battleships but was sure that the small ships would do their utmost; he was amazed that any destroyer could absorb eleven shell hits (three of which were fourteen-inch projectiles) and still steam away from the action under her own power; he was profoundly moved by the many stories of heroism, and by the mute but eloquent evidence of punishment and sacrifice that was apparent at every turn as he toured the ship. Finally he thanked us, with a sincerity that added a special quality to his words, and said, ‘God bless you!’ We stood there filled with admiration, respect, and pride and watched him climb into a waiting jeep and drive off. It was an unforgettable, once-in-a-lifetime occasion. To those of us who witnessed it, Admiral Halsey’s name will always lead the list of inspirational combat leaders of World War II.”
ON NOVEMBER 22, Admiral Halsey shared his thinking with Nimitz concerning his decision to relieve Gil Hoover:
After analysis of the situation presented, I consider that the commanding officer, Helena, senior officer present in the task group, committed a serious and costly error in the action which he took; specifically:
a) He should have made radio report of the torpedoing at once. Radio silence, as a measure of concealment, had ceased to be effective since the enemy was in contact. Only positive action to keep him submerged could be expected to delay his report.
b) He should have instituted offensive action, together with, or closely followed by, rescue operations, utilizing at least one of his destroyers.
His failure to take prompt action on the above lines was further aggravated by lack of any follow-up to insure that senior commands were informed of the Juneau’s loss. Commander South Pacific was first apprised of this fact as a result of his own inquiry into Juneau’s status when she was not included in the arrival report of the group.
…
In view of the above circumstances, I have this date relieved Captain G. C. Hoover of his command of the USS Helena, and ordered him by dispatch to proceed by the first available government air transportation and report to Commander-in-Chief for reassignment.
Canny, cautious, and discerning, Admiral Spruance picked up on an assumption that underlay Halsey’s censure—that Hoover had had the means at hand to attack the enemy submarine. He asked Hoover for comment, asking specifically whether his two destroyers