Neptune's Inferno_ The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal - James D. Hornfischer [267]
40: The Futility of Learning
“Ahhh, we are more”: Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 160. “A compromise dictated by necessity”: Halsey to Nimitz, First Endorsement of Commander, Task Force 67, “Report of Action Off Cape Esperance, Night of November 30, 1942,” 4. “I thought we had better”: Mustin interview, 650. Kinkaid’s relief: Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, 492–494. Lundstrom compares the grounds for Kinkaid’s relief with the grounds for Fletcher’s and argues that Fletcher got a raw deal. “About the last visual dispatch”: Wylie, NWC interview, 86. “A small wart”: USS Minneapolis, “Action Report for 30 November–1 December 1942,” Report of Radar Officer, 2. “REQUEST PERMISSION” and “the most stupid thing”: Wylie, NWC interview, 86. “CAN YOU SEND BOATS?”: Wright (CTF 67), “Report on Action Off Cape Esperance, Night of November 30, 1942,” Compilation of TBS Transmissions, 5 (this message sent at 1620 Z); Mustin interview, 631–632. “Belay supply schedule”: Hara, Japanese, 162. Damage to New Orleans: Wright, supplement to CTF 67 action report, 6; USS New Orleans, Report of the Executive Officer, action report, December 3, 1942, 1. New Orleans abandon ship canceled: Wristen, History of the United States Navy Ship New Orleans, 4–3. Hayter, Haines, and Forman: Brown, Hell at Tassafaronga, 131–132. “I wondered what he thought about”: Forgy, … And Pass the Ammunition, 212–213; see also Hartzell and Wristen, The USS New Orleans, An Amended History, 21–25. “The observed positions”: Wright, “Report on Action,” 9–10. According to Ernest M. Eller, who served CINCPAC as assistant head of gunnery and antisubmarine training officer, “The real factor that defeated all of our training in anti-torpedo operations was its high speed at long range. These Japanese torpedoes would run at about 45 or 46 knots and could go, I believe, eleven miles at that rate. Of course, our torpedo at that speed would run only three miles. We operated on the assumption that if we stayed outside of 10,000 yards until we fired, then we could maneuver and avoid the torpedoes because at a longer range we could set our torpedoes at about 25 or 26 knots. In all the night actions in which we received damage—and most of them we received very serious damage—it was because of this fact that we didn’t understand the torpedo and its capabilities.” Eller interview, vol. 2, 614–615. Submarine torpedoes at Tassafaronga: Halsey to King, First Endorsement of Wright, “Report on Action,” 1–2. “Picked off like mechanical ducks”: Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, 306. “Contributed greatly to the destruction”: Wright, “Performance of Duty in Action with Enemy,” 1–3. “He did nothing heroic”: Wristen, History, 4–3. Wristen added, “The award is an example of the pre-war Navy where the captain had to be awarded a medal equal to the