Official and Confidential_ The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover - Anthony Summers [250]
Chapter 29
1. Some theorized that Johnson wanted a ‘lone nut’ version because he feared rumors of Soviet involvement could lead to nuclear war. This may have been a factor.
2. Hoover tried to discredit citizens who publicly challenged the ‘lone gunman’ thesis. He authorized the mailing of a phony anonymous letter attacking the attorney Mark Lane and ordered circulation of a photograph that allegedly showed Lane engaged in sexual activity. The photograph and memo went to at least one member of the Warren Commission: Congressman Hale Boggs. (Baumgartner to Sullivan, Feb. 24, 1964, IC 6, p. 762, H to SAC NY, Oct. 16, 1964, FBI 100-11844, DeLoach to T, Sept. 26, 1966, Mark Allen FOIA release Civil Action 81–1206, [photo] blind memo, Feb. 29, 1968, Fred Graham Papers, LC, ints. Graham, 1990, and Thomas Boggs, 1988, Mother Jones, Aug. 1979.)
3. Also excised from the original address book page is a (scoredthrough) name that appears to be ‘Gandy.’ It may be pure coincidence that this was the name of Hoover’s secretary (Helen Gandy). But the record suggests Oswald was so angry with what he saw as FBI harassment before the assassination that he intended to complain to ‘the proper authorities.’ It is possible that, like countless callers over the years, Oswald had tried calling Hoover, was brushed off by Gandy and scrawled her name in his address book. While under arrest he made ‘derogatory remarks’ about Hoover personally. (WC docs. 205, 16.64, WR IV, 466ff.)
4. Two reporters, Alonzo Hudkins of The Houston Post and Hugh Aynesworth of The Dallas Morning News, later said that the ‘informant number’ published by Hudkins – S–172 – was fabricated, by Aynesworth, according to his own account in 1976. Their different accounts failed to satisfy students of the case. Other concerns aside, the number S–172 is very close to the code by which the FBI did refer to security informants at that time. In 1975, Dallas FBI Agent Joe Pearce told Bureau Inspectors that Oswald had been Hosty’s ‘informant or source.’ (Esquire, Feb. 1976, New Times, Jul. 11, 1975, HSCA Report, pp. 185ff, McNiff to Adams, Dec. 31, 1975, FBI 62–116395.)
5. The Commission did not even interview Deputy Sheriff Sweatt. It seems that the FBI, for its part, failed to tell the Commission about a similar allegation, by former Army Intelligence Colonel Philip Corso. (DeLoach to Mohr, two memos, Feb. 7, and another, Feb. 10, 1964, FBI 1977 release, no serial, Rosen to Belmont, Feb. 7, 1964, FBI 105–82555, ints. Mary and Julian Sourwine, 1991, int. Corso, 1992.)
6. Congress’ Assassinations Committee reported that Aleman’s FBI ‘contact’ at that time, ‘denied ever being told such information by Aleman.’ It is not clear whether this refers to Scranton, who refused comment as late as 1992. (HSCA Report p. 175, and int. 1992.)
7. Congress’ Assassinations Committee quoted Becker as saying he did not report the Marcello threat to the FBI in 1962. In 1992 he insisted that he did report it, and noted that the committee’s questioning of him was merely superficial. Its investigators spoke with him on the phone, but never in person. And he never testified. (HSCA IX, 83, int. Becker, 1992.)
8. Professor Robert Blakey, former Chief Counsel of Congress’ Assassinations Committee, recalled in 1992 that the mob’s violent talk on the wiretaps was circulated within the Justice Department. Independent research, however, showed no sign that it went to the Secret Service. Failure to circulate reports is sometimes justified on the grounds that it might risk exposure of an agency’s sources and methods. There can be no recourse to that excuse in the case of threats against the President’s life. (Intl. Robert Blakey, Mark Allen, 1992.)
9. One of Murchison’s friends, D. H. ‘Dryhole’