One Billion Customers - James McGregor [80]
We felt we had little choice but to take our fight to the top and we knew we would find allies there. The premier and president wanted to build accountable and stable domestic financial markets and maintain the country’s ability to gather billions in foreign capital through overseas listings of Chinese companies. Even so, we had to nullify the arguments of China’s security forces by acknowledging from the start that China had the right to monitor the information we were providing. We went to pains to emphasize that the data and information we were supplying were going to closed trading rooms and was not to be distributed publicly.
We were fortunate that China was desperately seeking entry to the World Trade Organization. We were able to become a minor roadblock in their way, one they badly wanted cleared. We also were able to capitalize on Xinhua’s stupid mistake in threatening to shut down our information and data feeds to Guangdong province on the same day that Britain was scheduled to return Hong Kong to Chinese rule. Don’t count on being handed a weapon like that.
As I look back on our strategies and tactics, I realized that by simply following our instincts on China, Richard Pascoe and I fought a very Chinese battle against our Chinese adversaries. There is a universal fear by government officials that something they do could be criticized for not upholding the country’s interests. We quickly and loudly—and truthfully—portrayed Xinhua’s plan as a selfish land grab that would be seriously detrimental to China’s national interests. We also used the law as a political weapon, just as the Communist Party does. We searched through international and domestic statutes and trade pacts to find language we could turn into noble weapons that put us on the side of the angels. We chose language that called for protection of intellectual property, fair competition among businesses, transparency in regulations, and similar issues that were stated Chinese government objectives and things they had agreed to in trade pacts. We weren’t building a legal case. We didn’t have a clear one. Instead, we used this assemblage of legal clauses to frame our political arguments and our propaganda campaign.
Except when going toe-to-toe with Xinhua in negotiations, we kept our message positive. We educated the relevant bureaucracies and business groups, from top to bottom, in the United States, Europe, and China on our point of view. Within China, without realizing it at the time, we employed the Communist Party’s favorite tactic of political struggles by isolating our adversaries and then attacking them politically. Our modern adjustment was to attack Xinhua as “counterproductive” not as “counterrevolutionaries.”
Finally, we took our case to anyone outside China who might be willing to help. Given the constant flood of foreign officials to Beijing and the relentless globe-trotting of Chinese officials, there are abundant opportunities to have your issue come up in conversation. Because of the circumstances surrounding our dispute, we were able at various times to enlist some very powerful players, including President Bill Clinton, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Senators Phil Gramm and John McCain, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. You may not be able to recruit such heavyweights, but your congressmen and various business associations and trade groups can make their voices heard. Draft the letters for their signatures. The easier you make it for the politicians, the more they’re willing to help.
My advice is that you write letter after letter after letter. China is ruled by the pen, not the sword. Blanket the bureaucracy and leadership circles with polite and professional letters that poke holes in your adversary’s action by asking questions and raising issues that will bolster your point of view. When Chinese bureaucracies get letters, they feel compelled to respond.