Our Last Best Chance_ The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril - King Abdullah II [151]
Once Netanyahu understood that, regardless of our differences, I was trying to find common ground, he began to relax. He told me that, at fifty-nine, he was almost as old as the state of Israel. And he believed that this was the first time in his almost sixty years that he had seen Israel and the Arabs face a common threat. I had warned President Obama that Netanyahu would most likely try to focus their discussion on Iran. Now he was doing the same thing with me.
“If you want us to feel that Iran is a common threat,” I said, “we will first have to solve the problem at the heart of our region’s woes, and that is the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is what matters most to us, and it is what you can do the most to impact.” I urged him to take serious steps toward reaching peace with the Palestinians and told him he would have to stop building new settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as they were eating away at land that should be part of the future Palestinian state and threatening the viability of a two-state solution. I also stressed the need to understand the sanctity of Jerusalem to all Muslims and to halt all unilateral actions in the holy city.
Netanyahu told me that there were some things he could not say in public, because of domestic political pressures. So talking about the need for a two-state solution and a freeze on settlements would not be easy for him. But he wanted to move forward and said he understood the importance of peace.
“If you genuinely want peace,” I said, “there are some important signals you can send to the Arab world. Convince us that you are committed to making something happen in the next several months. Otherwise the support of all Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Peace Initiative will start to wane.”
Our meeting went much better than I had expected. Netanyahu came across as a different man from the one I had known ten years before. He did not reject everything I said out of hand. He seemed eager to make progress, but I knew that the proof of his intent would be in his actions, not his words.
After forty minutes alone, we moved into an expanded session with members of our staff. We had begun to discuss the details of the peace process when Netanyahu said that he intended to focus on the economic track.
I argued that economic opportunities could not be an alternative to political independence for the Palestinians. “What about the political track?” I pressed. “Given your history, the Arabs expect you to focus on economic and security issues at the expense of peace talks.”
Netanyahu took my comments in stride and said that perhaps he should start with the political track. But he offered no concrete indication of what he might be prepared to do.
“That would be the prudent thing to do,” I said, hoping to hammer the message home.
Once he had left, I reflected on where we stood. Netanyahu was a right-winger through and through, but I hoped we would be able to work together to bring a lasting peace to the region. We had the Arab Peace Initiative. We had an engaged U.S. president. Was it too much to hope that we might also have a pragmatic Israeli prime minister who would want to leave behind him a legacy of peace?
Chapter 27
Fortress Israel or a Fifty-Seven-State Solution?
Throughout the spring and early summer of 2009, I remained optimistic that we were on the brink of a breakthrough.