Paris After the Liberation_ 1944 - 1949 - Antony Beevor [14]
Suggestions that Churchill back in London had received the message that ‘we’ve got somebody here who’s going to have a crack at Darlan’ are almost certainly wrong. But whispers of the forthcoming attempt had clearly reached London, even if SOE’s headquarters in Baker Street was taken by surprise. (That apparently did not stop several people from calling for champagne when the news arrived.) The American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) office in London, however, knew in advance and applauded the project. Most OSS officers were exasperated by their own president’s tolerance of Vichy. Yet Roosevelt himself now shrugged off the death of his erstwhile protégé in a most unattractive way. He referred to Darlan as a ‘skunk’, and at a New Year’s Eve dinner at the White House, he dismissed him as a ‘sonofabitch’, shocking a number of his guests.
The only replacement for Darlan acceptable to Roosevelt was the honourable, but infinitely less clever, General Giraud. De Gaulle said little on the subject. He must have sensed that ‘the tin soldier’, if handled properly, could soon be pushed to the sidelines. De Gaulle never acknowledged that, whatever its motives, Roosevelt’s policy may have worked in his own best interests. American support for Darlan and then Giraud had provided two stepping stones from Vichy to Free France, thus averting the danger of civil war in French North Africa.
The German invasion of the unoccupied zone had changed things in other ways. When Vichy’s ‘army of the armistice’ was disbanded, large quantities of weapons suddenly became available to the Resistance. Many of its officers joined or set up groups belonging to the ORA (Organisation de Résistance de l’Armée) led by General Revers. Reluctant to support de Gaulle, they were prepared to acknowledge General Giraud.
The most important effect, however, was moral. Laval’s open support of Nazi Germany, with the dispatch of French volunteers in Wehrmacht uniform to the Russian front, stood out even more as an act of treason. Yet the worst form of vassalage was the STO (Service de Travail Obligatoire). This destroyed the last shreds of the argument that Pétain’s ‘path of collaboration’ had saved France from the same fate as other occupied countries. Those due for military conscription were sent to Germany to work as forced labour in terrible conditions. Thousands evaded this draft by going into hiding or swelling the ranks of the Resistance.
The Resistance already contained a remarkable political and social mixture – in some groups regular officers, socialists, students both left-wing and Catholic, and Spanish Republicans all fought alongside each other – but as the prospect of liberation approached, and with it the political implications of a post-war order, the thinking of the main movements became more defined. De Gaulle strongly disliked the idea of political consciousness and party activity. Power struggles at the time of liberation might well lead to disturbances or even civil war, giving the Americans and British an excuse to impose their military government on France.
Such a danger could be averted only by uniting the different Resistance movements and bringing them under his own apolitical command; this unity was achieved largely through the efforts and personality of Jean Moulin.
Between April and September 1941, Moulin learned as much as he could about the various Resistance movements in France, which were divided into three main groups. With this information, he decided to go to England and see General de Gaulle.
After a long journey via Spain and Portugal, Moulin landed in Bournemouth. He was swept off by Maurice Buckmaster, the head of SOE’s Section F, who wanted to recruit him as a potential coordinator for his groups in France; but Moulin insisted on reporting to de Gaulle. Unlike many early members of the Resistance, Moulin did not fear the General as a future military dictator. He saw that without the unifying figure of de Gaulle, the Resistance