Rawhide Down_ The Near Assassination of Ronald Reagan - Del Quentin Wilber [134]
“Remind me to tell you a sensation”: Allen tapes; Allen notes.
Jim Baker knew that the administration: Interview with Baker.
“We have this information”: Television video footage of press briefing.
He had ordered that a heart bypass machine: Interview with Cheyney.
2.275 liters of blood: Gens notes; Aaron reflection.
Joe Giordano asked for: Interview with Giordano.
12: A Question of Authority
At about 3:30: Interview with Allen; Allen notes and Allen tapes. Caspar Weinberger arrived at about 3:30 p.m. He was late, in part, because he had sent his military driver on an errand for his wife, according to Bobby Inman, a former navy admiral and deputy director of the CIA. Inman and his driver gave Weinberger a ride to the White House.
Meese reported: Interview with Allen; Allen notes. At times, Allen put his tape recorder up to the phone’s receiver.
He then reminded Weinberger: Weinberger memo, RRPL. In relaying this conversation in his memo, Weinberger wrote: “He then said to me, ‘Under these circumstances, it is my understanding that National Command Authority devolves on you.’ I said that I believed the chain started with the Vice President. Ed Meese said the Vice President was on a plane in Texas, which was being diverted back to Washington and that it would take him approximately two hours to get here. I asked about the communication to the plane, and which plane it was, and Ed said that he did not know but he did not think there was secure communication. He mentioned again the chain of leadership under the National Command Authority and I confirmed I was the next in line after the Vice President.”
The National Command Authority is distinct from the order of presidential succession. The details of National Command Authority are classified but generally concern procedures that “cover certain delegations from the president to the vice president and the secretary of defense in the event of specific circumstances,” according to a memo drafted by White House counsel Fred Fielding the day after the shooting.
Concerned that they might need the: The football contains the nuclear war plans and attack options; the laminated code card has a series of alphanumeric codes that the president uses to authenticate his identity in the event he wants to launch a nuclear weapon. If the president cannot be reached, the military finds the next person in the chain of command—the vice president and then the secretary of defense, who also have authentication cards. The FBI seized Reagan’s card when it collected evidence from the hospital. This set off a fight between FBI agents, who considered the card to be evidence, and military officers, who wanted it back because it was a national security secret. The FBI took the card and put it in a safe. It was eventually returned to the military after Attorney General William French Smith mediated the dispute. The clash became public in December 1981, when the Washington Post published a story about the FBI’s seizure of the card. Fischer said in an interview that he was questioned by FBI agents at the hospital after the shooting. During the interview, an agent pulled the nuclear code card out of a plastic bag and asked Fischer what it was. “It is critical to national security and it should immediately be turned over to the military aide,” Fischer responded. When the FBI agent pressed for more information, Fischer simply told the agents that the card was classified and they did not have the necessary clearances to possess it.
The agent took off his shoe, put the card in it, placed the shoe back on his foot, and left the room.
Just as Allen and Weinberger: Allen tapes.
John Hinckley, leaning: Interview with Stephen T. Colo.
It was 3:50 p.m.: Interview with Colo; Colo Secret Service reports.
The agent said nothing: Testimony of Colo at a pretrial evidence suppression hearing.
Colo tracked down Eddie: Interview with Colo.
At 5:15 p.m.,