Rawhide Down_ The Near Assassination of Ronald Reagan - Del Quentin Wilber [15]
A staunch anticommunist, Allen had spent years honing his arguments about the dangers posed by the Soviets. He often spoke in complete paragraphs, and his deep, naturally authoritative voice never seemed to betray any doubt about the correctness of his views. But if he was usually serious and sober, he could also be puckish and charming, especially when he performed what was generally regarded as the best impersonation in Washington of Henry Kissinger, his deep voice, German accent, and all.
Allen, who supported Reagan in the 1976 primary against Ford, became an ardent admirer of Reagan’s a year later. In early 1977, Allen was mulling a bid for the governorship of his native New Jersey. After Ford’s loss to Carter the previous fall, Reagan was one of the brightest stars on the Republican stage, and Allen knew that Reagan’s assistance could prove critical to his own success on the campaign trail. About ten days after Carter’s inauguration, Allen flew to Los Angeles, rented a car, and drove up to Pacific Pallisades to ask the former governor of California to sign fund-raising letters for his campaign. Sitting with Reagan in his living room, Allen also asked whether Reagan would be willing to come to New Jersey to campaign for him.
“Why, yes, I’d be happy to do that,” Reagan replied. “But you came all the way out here to ask that? Why didn’t you just call me on the telephone?”
“Well, it’s not the same thing as meeting you face-to-face, Governor,” Allen said.
Soon they were sipping coffee, eating sandwiches, and chatting about a wide range of topics. Reagan had read one of Allen’s books—Allen had written or edited several on national security matters and communism—and the former governor peppered his guest with questions about Marxist theory, the Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev, and the machinations in the Politburo. The two men also had a long discussion about presidential power and how a president could shape global politics. Allen was impressed that Reagan was so well versed in foreign policy; the perception conveyed by the press was that he knew little about the world outside Hollywood.
Six hours after their conversation began, Reagan walked Allen to the front door. “Some people say I’m very simplistic,” Reagan told his guest. “But there is a difference between being simplistic and simple. A lot of things are very simple if you think them through. So, keeping that in mind, here is my theory of the Cold War: we win; they lose.”
The hair rose on Allen’s neck and arms. For years, he had waged a losing battle with American diplomats and officials who thought the Cold War was something to be managed and survived, not won. Now he felt as if he were in the presence of an oracle. Reagan firmly believed that the United States could prevail in the Cold War—but only by beefing up the military and negotiating from a position of strength, not weakness.
During the ride to the airport and on the long flight home, Allen’s mind buzzed with excitement as he thought about Reagan