Republic, Lost_ How Money Corrupts Congress--And a Plan to Stop It - Lawrence Lessig [104]
The best evidence of this influence is a recent paper that studied the effects on a staffer turned lobbyist when the member that former staffer worked for left Congress. Drawing upon the extensive data provided by the lobbying disclosure reports, political scientist Jordi Blanes i Vidal and his colleagues were able to calculate that a lobbyist with experience in the office of a senator sees a 24 percent drop in lobbying revenues immediately after that senator retires.28
When you look at these numbers, it is hard to understand them as anything except direct evidence of the channels of influence that the current system buys. In other words, the value of these lobbyists was to a significant extent a function of their connections. But why? What was the connection so valuable to the firm, if the connection itself wouldn’t translate into significant legislative benefit to the clients of the lobbying firm?
There’s nothing evil in the story of these staffers turned lobbyists. Or at least, there need be nothing evil. These are not people securing bribes; they are not even necessarily working against the ideals they believe in. Indeed, most of them are doing jobs they love. In this sense, they’re living an American dream, honorably and honestly, in the vast majority of cases.
The issue here is not whether these people are good. The issue is whether the system they work within is corrupt. Does it tend to distract members from their constituents? Does it build a dependency that conflicts with the dependency intended?
Of course it does. Or at least, most Americans would be justified in believing it did. This is just another example of how the current system differs fundamentally from the system our Framers intended. It is another example of a difference that matters.
CHAPTER 14
Two Conceptions of “Corruption”
So now I have to do some work. Some law work. I’ve walked you through an understanding of the corruption that is our government. That understanding differs from the standard story. It is more complex, more human, more difficult to change.
Now I need to tie that more complex story back to some legal doctrine. For our Supreme Court seems to say that there’s very little that Congress could do, constitutionally, to fix the problems I’ve described. Congress can, constitutionally, remedy “corruption,” the Court says. But the Court’s understanding of “corruption” excludes the problems I’ve described. It should not, and in the balance of this chapter, I try to make this point bulletproof.
I do this as an act of respect. The Supreme Court is not, in the sense I have described, corrupt. Quibble as we might about its sensitivity to politics, the Court is a gem of institutional integrity. If the Court just reflected a bit on why it had that integrity, it would understand a bit more why it must give Congress the opportunity to secure the same for itself.
The ordinary meaning of corruption—at least when we’re speaking of government officials, or public institutions—is clear enough. Corruption means bribery. Taking this (money) in exchange for that (special favor or privilege from the government). Quid pro quo.
In this sense, Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham (R-Calif.; 1991–2005) was corrupt. The government charged that he took over $2.4 million in exchange for securing contracts from the Defense Department. Duke was convicted, and sentenced to eight years and four months in prison.1
In this sense, Congressman William J. Jefferson (D-La.; 1991–2009) was corrupt. In a raid on Mr. Jefferson’s home, federal agents found $90,000 wrapped in aluminum foil in his freezer. He was charged with receiving up to $400,000 in bribes and alleged to have sought much more.2 In 2009 he received the largest prison sentence for corruption in the history of the United States Congress: thirteen years.
These are both classic instances of bent and