Republic, Lost_ How Money Corrupts Congress--And a Plan to Stop It - Lawrence Lessig [138]
Thus the states, in my view, are perfectly entitled to ask Congress to narrow the scope of the convention it convenes. The Congress, in my view, is perfectly entitled to set the agenda of that convention consistent with those requests. Congress restricts the convention only at its peril. The states impose too many restrictions on the call for a convention only at the convention’s peril. If a state says that it asks Congress to consider one topic only, then Congress will convene a convention only if thirty-four states make the same proposal. The movement for a convention requires a bit more flexibility. No doubt it is reasonable not to want a convention to roam wherever an academic would want. But it is politically foolish—if indeed the state wants a convention—to forbid it from at least discussing issues that might not yet seem compelling to that petitioning state.
These questions, however, do lead me to suggest a possible compromise. One way to avoid this runaway fear, while preserving the opportunity for states with different concerns to join with a common purpose (to have a convention), would be for the petition calling for the convention itself to also call on Congress to set certain limits to the scope of the convention. Here’s an example:
The State of Utah, speaking through its legislature, pursuant to Article V of the Constitution, hereby petitions the United States Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Furthermore, Utah would propose that convention consider amendments to strengthen the veto power of the president by, for example, among other possible solutions, giving him a “line-item-veto” authority.
Furthermore, Utah requests that its proposal notwithstanding, Congress restrict the agenda of the convention to considering only those matters enumerated by at least 40 percent of the states calling for the convention.
And finally, Utah requests that Congress exclude from eligibility as delegates to the convention any current Member of Congress.
This proposal explicitly calls for a convention for proposing amendments. It explicitly enumerates the particular type of amendment the state wants considered. But it asks Congress to filter out any subject that doesn’t have at least twenty states behind it. And it includes the (in my view, crucial) clause that no sitting member of Congress may be a delegate to this convention.
If thirty-four states passed a version of this application, then Congress would be required to call a convention. It would be entitled to set an agenda for the convention consistent with the 40 percent clause. And it would be entitled to ban members of Congress from being delegates to the convention.
That part is the easy work here. The hard work would be building the movement to support a convention. That building will take time, and a particularly risky strategy—at least for the movement. Like the transformative-president strategy, it is slow and deliberate; it happens state by state; it doesn’t assume the world pays attention all at once, but instead, it understands that people come to understanding in their own time and, increasingly, in 140-character missives. It would take a couple of years at least to get within striking distance of thirty-four states’ making the call. That’s plenty of time to educate and persuade.
But unlike the race for the presidency, this political battle doesn’t fit into any existing media category. So it might be hard to get the earned-media necessary to make it work. If Rhode Island passed a resolution, and then Washington, and then Iowa, those would be the first steps, but on a path that most don’t even recognize exists.
Likewise, unlike the race for the