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Johnson. Andrew Johnson, a southern Democrat, was the most important force blocking the Radical Republicans from achieving their objectives for Reconstruction. Lyndon Johnson, a southern Democrat, is, in my view, the most important political force correcting that deep injustice.

8. House: Federal Election Commission, Financial Activity of All U.S. House of Representatives Candidates: 1988–2000, available at link #86; Senate: Federal Election Commission, Financial Activity of All U.S. Senate Candidates: 1988–2000, available at link #87; Political Party Committees: Campaign Finance Institute, Hard and Soft Money Raised by National Party Committees: 1992–2010, available at link #88.

9. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money, 272.

10. Thomas Stratmann, “Some Talk: Money in Politics: A (Partial) Review of the Literature,” Public Choice 124 (2005): 135, 148.

11. See John C. Coates, IV, “ ‘Fair Value’ as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 147 (1999): 1251, 1273–77 (reviewing idea of a “control premium”).

12. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money, 201.

13. See Gary C. Jacobson, “Modern Campaigns and Representation,” in Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, eds., The Legislative Branch (Oxford University Press, 2005), 118.

14. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1974).

15. James J. Sample, “Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality” (Aug. 20, 2010), 10 (forthcoming in NYU Annual Survey of American Law); Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-29, available at link #89.

16. Samuel Issacharoff, “On Political Corruption,” Harvard Law Review 124 (2010): 119–20.

17. Sample, “Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth,” 10; Hofstra University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-29, available at link #89.

18. Huffington, Third World America, 127.

19. Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1998), 91.

20. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 224.

21. Ibid., 160.

22. Bertram Johnson, “Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?” American Politics Research 38 (2010): 890, 906.

23. Shigeo Hirano, James M. Snyder, Jr., Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Mark Hansen, “Primary Competition and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Senate,” National Science Foundation 2008, 4, finds that primaries don’t contribute to polarization in the Senate, but this is not inconsistent with the claim about gerrymandered safe seats in the House. Unlike the House, the boundaries of the Senate are set by state lines.

24. Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 47.

25. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 159.

26. Ibid.

27. Fiorina and Abrams, Disconnect, 87.

28. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Money Men: The Real Story of Fund-raising’s Influence on Political Power in America (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000), 11.

29. Fiorina and Abrams, Disconnect, 168.

30. “Top Industries: Senator Max Baucus 2003–2008,” Center for Responsive Politics, OpenSecrets.org, available at link #90.

31. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 238.

32. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money, 151.

33. Martin Schram, “Speaking Freely,” Center for Responsive Politics (1995), 151.

34. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money, 19.

35. Richard W. Painter, Getting the Government America Deserves (Oxford University Press, 2009), 181.

36. This theory has received new support from Google’s Ngram Viewer. See link #91.

37. William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Federal Lobbying Regulation: History through 1954,” in The Lobbying Manual, ed. William J. Luneburg et al., 4th ed. (2009), 7 n.7.

38. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 451 (1874).

39. Ken Silverstein, Turkmeniscam: How Washington Lobbyists Fought to Flack