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71. Hall and Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” 80.

72. Ibid., 81.

73. Ibid.

74. Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers, 191–92.

75. Hall and Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” 69 (emphasis added).

76. U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote on H.R. 6124, Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, available at link #123; U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Result for Roll Call 417, available at link #124.

77. “The Cash Committee: How Wall Street Wins on the Hill,” Huffington Post (Dec. 29, 2009), available at link #125.

78. Schram, “Speaking Freely,” 12.

79. Ibid., 18.

80. Ibid., 48–49.

81. Ibid., 93.

82. Birnbaum, The Money Men, 171.

83. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 67.

84. Hall and Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” 79.

85. Tolchin and Tolchin, Pinstripe Patronage, 78. This shape-shifting is also related to an argument by Harvard professor Jane Mansbridge about why contribution studies are not likely to measure influence. As she describes, interest groups funding campaigns will fund candidates who already believe in the policies the groups favor. This produces not “quid pro quo distortion,” as Mansbridge describes it, but “selection distortion,” eliminating even the need for shape-shifting as the change happens as the member is selected. Jane Mansbridge, “Clarifying the Concept of Representation,” unpublished manuscript, May 2011.

86. General Interim Report of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, H.R. Rep 3138, 81st Congress 2nd Session, 62.

87. Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, Leech, Lobbying and Policy Change, 2.

88. Interview with Larry Pressler, June 16, 2011 (on file with author).

89. The foundational work is George Stigler’s, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 3, and Richard Posner’s, “Taxation by Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 22. See also Richard A. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (1974): 335; Sam Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1976): 211; Burton Abrams and R. Settle, “The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections,” Journalof Political Economy 86 (1978): 245; James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (1980). Steven Croley’s is perhaps the best recent effort to summarize and extend this analysis as it affects agency regulation in particular. See Regulation and the Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government (2008).

90. Luigi Zingales, Preventing Economists’ Capture (2011), 2.

91. See generally Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (Oxford University Press, 1997).

92. Larry M. Bartels, “Economic Inequality and Political Representation,” working paper (2005), available at link #126.

93. Martin Gilens, “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness,” Public Opinion Quarterly 69 (2005): 778, 781–82. Gilens’s argument has been criticized by Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien; see “On the Limits to Inequality in Representation,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (2008): 319–27. But as Gilens writes in response to Soroka and Wlezien, his results and Bartels’s are consistent with those of a wide range of scholars, who all find “that more privileged subgroups of Americans have greater—and sometimes dramatically greater—sway over government policy.” Martin Gilens, “Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation,” PS: Political Science and Politics 42 (2009): 335–41, 335.

94. Gilens, “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness,” 778, 788.

95. Ibid.

96. Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics, 3.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., 16.

99. Ibid., 24.

100. Ibid., 194.

101. Ibid., 19.

102. Ibid., 21.

103. Rajan and Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, 92.

104. Ibid.

105. Gilens, “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness,