Republic, Lost_ How Money Corrupts Congress--And a Plan to Stop It - Lawrence Lessig [173]
23. Birnbaum, The Money Men, 191.
24. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money, 343–44.
25. Eric Lichtblau, “Lobbyist Charged with Hiding Political Donations,” New York Times, Aug. 5, 2010, A12, available at link #193; “104 Will Get You $300 Million,” New York Times, Feb. 19, 2009, A30, available at link #194. Ryan J. Reilly and Alex Sciuto, “Despite Donations to Girl Scouts, PMA Lobbyist Gets 27 Months,” TPMMuckraker (Jan. 7, 2011), available at link #195.
26. Judy Sarasohn, “Special Interests; Of Revolving Doors and Turntables,” Washington Post, Feb. 17, 2000, A29; Recording Industry Association of America, Wikipedia, available at link #196.
27. Lichtblau, “Lobbyist Charged with Hiding Political Donations”; “104 Will Get You $300 Million.”
28. Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen, “Revolving Door Lobbyists,” Center for Economic Performance Working Paper No. 993 (Aug. 2010).
Chapter 14. Two Conceptions of “Corruption”
1. Randal C. Archibold, “Ex-Congressman Gets 8-Year Term in Bribery Case,” New York Times, Mar. 4, 2006, available at link #197.
2. David Stout, “Ex-Louisiana Congressman Sentenced to 13 Years,” New York Times, Nov. 13, 2009, available at link #198.
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
4. See J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmussen, “Skewed Incentives: Paying For Politics as a Japanese Judge,” Judicature 83 (2000): 190.
5. James J. Sample, “Justice for Sale,” Wall Street Journal online (Mar. 22, 2008), available at link #199.
6. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “How to Save Our Courts,” Parade, Feb. 24, 2008, available at link #200.
7. Ibid. (emphasis added).
8. Sample, “Justice for Sale,” A24.
9. James J. Sample, “Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality” (Aug. 20, 2010), 23 (forthcoming in NYU Annual Survey of American Law); Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-29, available at link #89.
10. David Pozen, James Sample, and Michael Young, “Fair Courts: Setting Recusal Standards,” 11, available at link #201.
11. Sample, “Democracy at the Corner,” 20; Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-29, available at link #89.
12. Report of Stanford Law Student, Spring 2009, on file with author.
13. Stephen J. Ware, “Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama,” Capital University Law Review 30 (2002): 583, 584.
14. Adam Liptak and Janet Roberts, “Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings,” New York Times, Oct. 1, 2006, A1.
15. Adam Liptak, “Looking Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges,” New York Times, Jan. 29, 2008, A14, available at link #202.
16. It isn’t quite accurate historically to speak of both the House and Senate in this way, since the Senate was originally appointed by state legislatures. My analysis translates the view of the House to the norms for the now-elected Senate.
17. Sam Issacharoff advances a distinct conception of corruption that roughly parallels my sense of dependence corruption. He focuses upon the “clientelist” relation between “elected officials and those who seek to profit from relations to the state,” Samuel Issacharoff, “On Political Corruption,” Harvard Law Review 124 (2010): 121, the result of which is a “distortion of political outcomes as a result of the undue influence of wealth” (Ibid., 122).
18. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
19. Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 4.
20. “Geography Data 2008 Race: Massachusetts Senate,” Center for Responsive Politics (July 13, 2009), available at link #203.
21. Spencer Overton, “The Participation Interest,” Georgetown Law Journal (Forthcoming, 2012): 6.
22. Ibid., 3–4.
23. John Joseph Wallis, “The Concept of Systematic