• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

The consequence, of course, was that when the French returned, the Vietminh had gained a momentum which was to prove irreversible. The West had the worst of all possible worlds. The British showed poor judgement in supposing that the French status quo ante might be restored. The Americans allowed Ho Chi Minh to exploit U.S. support for his own political purposes, rather than in pursuit of the struggle against Japan. The cynicism of Wedemeyer and the OSS in denying even humanitarian aid to French troops after 9 March—when they were, after all, fighting the Japanese—invited dismay. The U.S. subsequently forfeited Indochinese goodwill by withdrawing its support from the Vietminh. Here was an ugly subplot to the war which did credit to no one.

A directive from the Political Warfare Executive in London to Mountbatten’s command highlighted the political and cultural complexities besetting the theatre: “Keep off Russo-Japanese819, Russo-Chinese and Sino-Japanese relations except for official statements. Do not comment on [Chongqing-Yan’an] relations…Continue to show that if Germany had prolonged her resistance the devastation would have been yet more terrible. Show that a worse fate awaits Japan if her militarists force her to fight on…Continue to avoid the alleged Japanese peace feelers.” At Britain’s Military Administration School in Wimbledon, and at the Malaya Planning Unit in London’s Hyde Park Gate, intensive planning had been taking place for years, in anticipation of the restoration of imperial rule in the east. Many of those involved, however, especially younger officers and civil servants, perceived that they were crafting a hollow crown.

BRITAIN’S Royal Navy was embarrassed by its difficulties in sustaining a small fleet alongside the great American armada off Okinawa. In the spring of 1945, however, it conducted a series of little actions which helped to revive its battered self-esteem. First, on 15–16 May, a destroyer flotilla fought what proved to be the last significant battle between surface ships in the Second World War. Signals intelligence revealed that the 13,380-ton heavy cruiser Haguro, with the escorting destroyer Kamikaze, was sailing to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean to deliver supplies and evacuate troops. After evading British submarines, Haguro was a hundred miles south-west of Phuket when spotted by a Fleet Air Arm Avenger shortly after noon on 15 May. Saumarez’s Captain Martin Power, leading five destroyers of “Force 61,” headed to attack the Japanese at twenty-seven knots. Given the overwhelmingly superior firepower of Haguro’s eight-inch guns, Power hoped to delay an engagement until nightfall, then close with torpedoes. Lest he be in any doubt as to his duty, he received a terse signal from his admiral: “You should sink enemy ships before returning.”

The British were relieved when dusk fell without a sighting. Thereafter, despite heavy rain which limited visibility, they were confident of defeating the Japanese when they found them. The destroyers steamed in line abreast, four miles apart, probing for electronic contact. At 2245, at an amazing range of 68,000 yards, Venus’s radar picked up the Japanese. An hour after midnight, the five British ships closed in a crescent on the enemy cruiser. Haguro, perceiving her danger, began to twist and turn, finally fleeing from the British at her full thirty-three knots. Venus missed a perfect chance to attack at almost point-blank range when her torpedo officer misjudged his settings. The British lit the sky with star shell, and began exchanging gunfire with Haguro. Splashes from Japanese near misses drenched the British bridge crews. Power said laconically: “If you’re only getting wet, there’s nothing to worry about.” A few seconds later, however, a direct hit wrecked one of Saumarez’s boilers. The ship rapidly lost way. Power had one brief chance: he swung the destroyer violently to port and fired eight torpedoes at 2,000 yards. A minute later, Verulam dispatched