Rifles - Mark Urban [190]
226 ‘actually flogged the infantry with their sabres to drive them before the rearguard’: John Cox MS Journal.
227 ‘In truth, though, neither of the officers who went from the 95th were original members of the battalion either’: these officers were Lieutenants Percival and Hamilton. The first was an experienced officer but neither had been serving as long in the Peninsula as the likes of Leach, Simmons, MacNamara et al. of the 1st Battalion. Kincaid says even Hamilton had seen enough fighting to satisfy any reasonable man, which is as maybe, but I still think the absence of the real veterans interesting in this case.
– ‘This affair caused lasting rancour between the Rifles and Skerrett’: Harry Smith is the prime example of this feud.
228 ‘They are expressly told to fire first at officers and in particular commanders and generals’: this fascinating quotation of Soult’s comes from a letter dated 1 September 1813 to Clarke, the Minister of War, and is reproduced in Clerc. Soult attributed all the killing to the 5th/60th – an error since the bridge of Vera was an affair fought entirely by the 2nd/95th and some men of the 3rd/95th and was mentioned in Soult’s letter as part of the phenomenon he was discussing. Evidently the French High Command knew that the assassination of their officers by riflemen had reached epic proportions, but they were fuzzy on the details of exactly who was doing it. The 5th/60th may have been held responsible because they had more desertions than the 95th and much French knowledge of this kind would have been based on deserters. It is also worth pointing out that Soult was exaggerating his officer losses for effect, just as he understated them on other occasions when he wished to minimise the magnitude of his setbacks.
229 ‘Kempt’s attack, however, was ordered almost entirely in skirmish order’: Leach’s MS Journal, Hennell and Cooke are good sources on this.
– ‘The 95th moved regularly (I do not mean in a line) up the hill’: Hennell’s letter to his brothers of 13 October 1813; ditto the following quotation about the 95th’s prowess.
– ‘they fired off some ineffective volleys which all went too high’: a good deal of detail in this passage comes from Moore Smith’s life of Colborne.
230 ‘The only way was to put a brave face on the matter’: Moore Smith.
– ‘We remained a whole month idle spectators of their preparations’: Kincaid, Adventures.
– ‘One soldier of the 3rd Battalion, 95th, for example, … transported for life’: Private John Howley of the 3rd/95th was tried on 3 November 1813, according to General Orders. The 1st Battalion’s desertions are recorded in WO 25/2139.
231 ‘The successes in Germany are most exhilarating’: this letter from Judge Day is quoted in FitzMaurice’s book.
– ‘Peace is now I think fairly beyond doubt’: this letter was written by Hennell on 25 November 1813. I’ve taken a slight liberty with the timings here, but there was plenty of speculation about the downfall of Napoleon even before late November. Hennell is also the source of the lovely phrase about ‘gaping for news’.
232 ‘I have been thinking of visiting you this winter after the campaign is over’: Simmons, letter of 30 August 1813.
– ‘These fellows think themselves invulnerable’: this Wellington ‘O Group’ is recounted in Moore Smith.
233 ‘That this was an anxious, I might say awful moment’: Leach MS Journal.
– ‘Eh, but Fitz, just see how easy it slips in’: FitzMaurice. It is curious how similar this anecdote of Church is to some of those later (e.g. Vietnam) accounts of soldiers who, when asked the question ‘How can you shoot women and children?’ replied ‘You just lead a little less.’
– ‘One of our officers gallantly jumped into the second fort’: Cooke.
235 ‘“a swarm of skirmishers” had made the attack’: this is General Marinsin’s report of the battle, quoted by Clerc.
TWENTY-TWO The Nive
236 ‘opened his mouth and well and truly said the wrong thing’: the accounts of Cooke and Hennell of this bloody incident are both gripping. Neither explicitly blames Hobkirk