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hatch from the eggs; the toxin is supposed to kill insect larvae. When Cornell University investigators dusted laboratory milkweed leaves with pollen from Bt corn, the results were only to be expected: the test larvae grew more slowly and died more quickly than those fed leaves dusted with pollen from conventional corn or with no pollen at all.52 This research note, taking up less than a page in a scientific journal (albeit the prestigious Nature), elicited an immediate response: “Will the conjectured absence of butterflies flapping their wings on Iowa farms provoke political firestorms among Washington policymakers?” Indeed, yes. Farmers did not want to be termed “butterfly-killers,” and neither did Congress. Legislators proposed an appropriation of $200,000 to study the effect of transgenic foods on monarch butterflies and also introduced legislation to require labeling.53 Monarch butterflies became the symbol of antibiotechnology protests, as illustrated in figure 18.

From the industry standpoint, killing butterflies and other friendly insects is normal collateral damage, no worse than the effects of conventional pesticides. Using this argument to deflect appeals for preservation of an already endangered species, however, would be unlikely to succeed. Thus, the industry employed different strategies. The first was to discredit the science by pointing out, correctly, that one small laboratory study should not be taken too seriously until it is confirmed. Second, the industry funded new studies, reportedly at $100,000 each, to repeat the work in field trials. Third, it organized a scientific symposium to publicize the results of those trials.54 The industry-funded studies produced the expected conclusion: transgenic crops pose no risk to monarch butterflies. This outcome was so certain that the industry sponsors distributed a news release prior to the conference: “Scientific symposium to show no harm to monarch butterfly.”55 The conference itself, however, proved rather contentious. Some participants complained about manipulation by the industry: “It was dirty pool and the fox was guarding the chicken coop. . . . It was not conclusive.”56 Independent scientists were appalled by the industry’s heavy-handed control of a meeting at which researchers—many with only preliminary results to report—were supposed to be presenting and discussing them in a careful and deliberate manner.

FIGURE 18. The FDA’s Washington, DC, hearings on genetically modified foods in November 1999, drew demonstrators dressed as monarch butterflies. This photograph appeared in the New York Times Magazine, December 12, 1999. (© 1999 AP/Wide World Photos by J. Scott Applewhite. Reprinted with permission.)

Further studies attempted to resolve the issue. One reported that pollen from Bt corn did not harm black swallowtail butterflies. The authors concluded, “at least some potential nontarget effects of the use of transgenic plants may be manageable,” but “the plain fact of the matter is that growing food has nontarget effects. . . . Our challenge is to minimize them.”57 Another found just the opposite, but came to the same conclusion: Bt pollen on milkweeds in corn fields caused “significant mortality” of monarch butterfly larvae: “This is telling us that with naturally deposited pollen there’s a good probability you’ll get some mortality.”58

Although it might seem self-evident that Bt pollen kills “nontarget” insects as well as those it is intended to control, the industry and its federal regulators have taken heroic—and expensive—steps to prove the trivial nature of such collateral damage. In December 1999, the EPA “called in” (translation: asked for) comments from researchers on the toxicity of Bt corn pollen. In February 2000, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) held a conference to respond to that call-in and to set research priorities for determining the safety of Bt pollen for monarch butterflies. Its own in-house researchers spent two years investigating this question (conclusion: “negligible” risk).59 In September 2000, the EPA issued