Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [128]
The FDA review process went slowly because the science was in its infancy and Calgene researchers had to scramble to respond to the agency’s requests. Dr. Martineau’s book describes the haste with which Calgene scientists conducted the research. Eventually, the FDA ran out of issues for which it could demand evidence and asked the Food Advisory Committee to review the Calgene materials. I was a member of the committee during that review. We had no obvious reason to think the Flavr Savr unsafe. The tomato contained its own gene and seemed more innocuous than rBGH. The use of the antibiotic-resistance marker gene was the one issue debated. Nevertheless, some of us were troubled by the FDA’s insistence that our discussion focus exclusively on safety questions. We were prohibited from raising any other issues—the effect that transgenic tomatoes might have on local tomato growers, for example. The benefit of the tomatoes to consumers seemed to be a taste only marginally better than that of standard supermarket varieties. Furthermore, the Flavr Savr would be expensive—two or three times the price of conventional tomatoes—and the higher cost identified it as a luxury product targeted to an upscale market. Such factors, and whether anyone needed such a tomato, were not open to consideration.
The FDA approved the tomato in May 1994, a decision enthusiastically applauded by the agricultural biotechnology industry. Some consumer groups observed that the FDA’s review had been an anomaly because Calgene had volunteered for it and companies were not required to produce safety data. Some antibiotechnology groups such as the Pure Food Campaign led by Jeremy Rifkin, threatened picket lines, tomato dumpings, boycotts, and legal challenges. Mr. Rifkin said, “Calgene has miscalculated in the most profound way. It spent an enormous amount of money and it never asked the simplest question: Do people want this tomato? And I say people don’t want this tomato. The bottom line is, who needs it?”49 Despite such objections, I thought people would buy the tomato if they perceived the improved taste to be worth the increased cost. Within days after the FDA approval, Calgene began test marketing the tomatoes in California and Illinois—priced competitively. By all reports the first Flavr Savr tomatoes flew off the shelves.
It soon became evident that problems other than pricing would determine the Flavr Savr’s success. The company developed the tomatoes in California but grew them in Florida, where they did not easily adapt to local climate, pest, or commercial contracting conditions. During transportation, the tomatoes turned to mush. Calgene was unable to solve these problems and gave up on the product. Despite the marketing disaster, the tomato produced commercial benefits. FDA approval of the relatively benign Flavr Savr paved the way for subsequent approvals of Calgene’s seed oils, herbicide-resistant cotton, and other transgenic foods. Calgene hoped that these products might prove profitable and help overcome its reported losses of more than $80 million; it continued to report losses through 1994. In 1995, Monsanto bought nearly half the company and owned all of it by 1997.50 The Flavr Savr gamble made it easier for other companies to obtain FDA approvals for their products, and the entire industry owed Calgene a debt of gratitude. Although the FDA subsequently approved transgenic tomatoes produced by other companies, no such varieties were available fresh in supermarkets late in 2002.
GM Tomato Paste. During the FDA committee review, I was surprised by Calgene’s determination to grow fresh tomatoes for sale in supermarkets—no matter how upscale—because processed tomatoes seemed to be a more secure business opportunity. People eat more processed tomatoes than fresh (on pizza, for example),