Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [169]
Table 16 summarizes some of the most prominent incidents from 2006 to 2009. Each of these incidents reveals key flaws in the present food safety system and the need for legislative measures to address these flaws.
2006: Spinach (E. coli O157:H7). This outbreak was notable for the trouble it caused and its source. Of the 205 people who became ill, about 30 developed hemolytic uremia syndrome, and three died. The source was a widely distributed Dole brand of bagged baby spinach packed by Natural Selection Foods, a company run by Earthbound Farms, a leading supplier of organic vegetables. Because the packing plant washed the spinach thoroughly, the company and growers were shocked to learn that washing was insufficient to remove the pathogen. Growers also were shocked by the subsequent losses of sales, estimated at $100 million. By 2009, spinach sales had not yet returned to pre-outbreak levels.18
Investigators traced the spinach to a particular field in the middle of a cattle ranch one mile away from a stream used by the free-range cattle as a crossing. They isolated the outbreak E. coli strain from stream water, cattle feces, and the feces of wild boar at the crossing, but found none in the spinach field. Contaminated water from the cattle crossing seemed a likely source, as did wild boar. Investigators sampled wild animals in the area and found the outbreak strain in cattle (34 percent of samples), wild boar (15 percent), water, and soil, but in no other animals. Later, the California Department of Fish and Game found the strain in only one of 184 wild boar. Investigators concluded that “no definitive determination could be made regarding how E. coli O157:H7 pathogens contaminated spinach in this outbreak.”19
But how had the bacteria survived washing? The packing plant used state-of-the-art washing procedures under a HACCP plan. Investigations revealed only minor procedural flaws. Although this was the twentieth E. coli O157:H7 outbreak from leafy greens in recent years, nobody seemed to have come to grips with how firmly these bacteria adhere to leaf surfaces. They can be incorporated into lettuce or spinach leaves just under the surface and form tightly adhering biofilms.20
Although the spinach was marketed as conventional, industrial growers immediately blamed the outbreak on manure-based fertilizers used in organic production. In October 2006, I wrote an opinion piece for the San Jose Mercury News listing the obvious lessons taught by the outbreak—prevention is essential, voluntary never works, industrial agriculture has its down side—among them, “don’t blame organics this time.”21 A vegetable grower in California soon set me straight. He knew that the spinach was in the second year of the three-year transition required for organic certification. Even so, manure was probably not the source, as no trace of the outbreak strain appeared on the spinach field.
Early in 2007, I visited Earthbound Farms and its packing plant and met with its microbiological consultant. The company had instituted test-and-hold procedures to prevent contaminated produce from coming into or leaving the plant. Such practices should be standard for this industry. California now requires the leafy greens industry to use good manufacturing practices (GMPs), but these are voluntary. The FDA, which had been advising lettuce growers to use GMPs for years, extended its voluntary guidance to spinach.22
In spring 2007, I attended a meeting of California vegetable producers at which Bill Marler, an attorney who represents victims of foodborne illness, challenged growers to “put me out of business.” He warned that voluntary actions would not succeed and nothing short of mandatory federal regulations would be effective, not least because of the high human costs of foodborne illness. One of his spinach clients spent 51 days in the hospital and 18 days on dialysis, with medical